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Antitrust Deterrence of Patent Holdup:
Refocusing on Competition as a Driver of
Technological Innovation
Michelle Emeterio*
Traditionally, antitrust law has served as both deterrent against and remedy for the
monopolistic behavior known as patent holdup. Yet those who profit from patent holdup not
only deny its existence but also until very recently wielded an enticing critique of the role of
antitrust law in its deterrence—namely, that antitrust law (1) disincentivizes technological
innovation and (2) incentivizes infringement.
After exploring patent holdup and why the modern and historical goals of antitrust law
are well suited to combatting it, this Note provides direct and circumstantial evidence of the
existence of patent holdup as a real-world problem. It also looks at how a sociopolitical power
imbalance at work from 2017 until 2021 bolstered attempts to immunize standard-essential
patents from antitrust scrutiny. Next, it covers why contract law alone is insufficient to remedy
or deter patent holdup. Additionally, this Note debunks the misguided admonition that
innovation will be deterred by antitrust scrutiny. Such admonition is premised on the notions
that unqualified patent rights, such as the right to maximize prices and the right to exclude
others from practicing one’s patent, are necessary incentives for innovation and that antitrust
enforcement suppresses these incentives. This Note ends with a realistic view of the role of
injunctions in the context of standard-essential patents and the conclusion that a recent
governmental policy shift towards continuing to allow firms to seek injunctions while preserving
the role of antitrust law is the only sensible approach to take.

* Juris Doctor, University of California, Irvine School of Law, Class of 2021, cum laude. Many thanks
to Professor Christopher Leslie for his insight and encouragement, and to Alice Doyle, Alicia
Hernandez and the other Law Review editors for their many brilliant suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent law and antitrust law are complementary in that they both aim to
promote innovation and competition.1 This Note is about maintaining the
1. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 ( Fed. Cir. 1990 )
( “[ T ]he aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds.
However, the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging
innovation, industry and competition.” ( citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal LTD., 781 F.2d 861, 876–77
( Fed. Cir. 1985 ), overruled by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059
( Fed. Cir. 1998 ) ) ); Statement of Interest of the United States at 4, Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci,
LLC, 485 F. Supp. 3d 712 ( N.D. Tex. 2020 ) (No. 19-CV-02933 ) [ hereinafter Statement of Interest ],
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1253361/download [ https://perma.cc/Q7JN-
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complementary alignment between these two bodies of law, particularly in the
context of technological standards. More specifically, it explores the perfect fit
between antitrust law and standard-essential patents. It focuses on the goal of
keeping antitrust law at play in order to deter what is known as patent holdup and
to promote technological innovation. This focus remains especially important in
light of several years of attacks on the applicability of antitrust law in connection
with technological standards.2
Given recent political developments, the time is now to distinguish which
arguments about patent holdup have merit and which do not.3 First, legislators from
both sides of the aisle are “increasingly focus[ed] on tech companies and
[anticompetitive] practices.”4 Second, in a July 2021 Executive Order, President
Biden called for initiatives that will promote competition, such as revising a Joint
Policy Statement on remedies for standard-essential patents (SEPs) subject to fair,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) commitments.5 Third, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) released a draft revised policy statement in December
of 2021 and requested public comments for the statement until February 4, 2022.6
This draft revised policy statement has already been touted as “reestablish[ing]

LS8F] (“[ T]he policies of the patent laws and antitrust laws are aligned in their mutual aim to foster
innovation that creates dynamic competition.” ); cf. Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the Concept of Exclusion
in Patent Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1643, 1656 ( 2010 ) ( “Patent law is an artificial deviation from
competition.” (internal quotations omitted ) ( citing Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley,
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 267 n.33 ( 2007 ) ) ); Letter from Thom Tillis, U.S. Sen., to
Merrick Garland, Att’y Gen. & Jonathan Kanter, Assistant Att’y Gen. ( Jan. 19, 2022 ) [ hereinafter Letter
from Thom Tillis ], https://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/1.19.2022-LTRSenator-Tillis-to-AG-Garland-and-AAG-Kanter.-Final.docx.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/9B7M-YBR8 ]
( “Antitrust and intellectual property policies need to work together to create a balanced, strong,
innovation ecosystem.” ).
2. See Rosa Morales, Can Antitrust Enforcement Be a Tool for Racial Equity?, LAW360
( Mar. 30, 2021, 6:03 PM ), https://www.law360.com/articles/1370258 [ https://perma.cc/548J3H2D ] ( “Sen. Amy Klobuchar, D-Minn.—who chairs the U.S. Senate’s Subcommittee on Competition
Policy, Antitrust and Consumer Rights—recently commented that increasing market power and
concentration, and decades of court rulings and lax regulation by agency enforcers, have been key
contributors to the monopoly problem, particularly in Big Tech.” ).
3. See id. ( “[ R ]ecent legislative and executive developments may portend a policy shift in
antitrust enforcement in a political environment with rare bipartisan support for reining in market
power in and beyond Big Tech.” ).
4. See James Arkin, Bipartisan Senators to Target Big Tech in Competition Bill, LAW360
( Oct. 14, 2021, 5:19 PM ), https://law360.com/articles/1431044 [ https://perma.cc/6RQD-XVT6 ].
5. Promoting Competition in the American Economy, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987, 36,991–92 ( July 14,
2021 ), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-07-14/pdf/2021-15069.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/6LGT-CE5G ].
6. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. & ANTITRUST
DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DRAFT POLICY STATEMENT ON LICENSING NEGOTIATIONS AND
R EMEDIES FOR S TANDARDS -E SSENTIAL P ATENTS S UBJECT TO V OLUNTARY F/RAND
COMMITMENTS ( 2021 ) [ hereinafter “DRAFT POLICY STATEMENT” ], https://www.justice.gov/atr/
page/file/1453471/download [ https://perma.cc/4JVT-TUKJ ]. As of this writing, political
developments surrounding the revised Joint Policy Statement are evolving. Developments occurring
after April 11, 2022 will not be captured before this Note goes to print.
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balance in negotiations between SEP holders and implementers by removing the
threat of illegitimate exclusionary relief.”7
Part I of this Note provides an overview of patent holdup and explains why it
is anticompetitive. Part II explores real-world evidence that patent holdup actually
happens and takes a deeper look at why it implicates antitrust scrutiny under both
modern and historical goals of antitrust law. It includes a concrete example of a
sociopolitical power imbalance at work—the kind that can both arise from and seek
to perpetuate patent holdup. Part III discusses why antitrust enforcement is not
only implicated but also necessary. It explains why contract law alone cannot
maintain the integrity of the standard-setting and implementation processes and
then debunks the myth that innovation will suffer if antitrust law remains involved.
It next discusses the reality that patent owners are not victims in a world where
patent holdup is deterred because if they do not want to agree to fair and reasonable
patent-licensing terms, they can stay out of collective standard setting by developing
and implementing fully proprietary products instead. Lastly, in Part IV, this Note
rebuts the allegation that antitrust scrutiny incentivizes patent infringement by
limiting the availability of injunctions. Granted, those taking a pro-injunction
approach are partially right in that the fear of an antitrust lawsuit could deter a patent
owner from seeking an injunction. But any claims that the availability of injunctions
has been or will be foreclosed in the standards context are blatantly wrong and
distract from the important goal of maintaining antitrust liability.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Standardization
Standards-setting organizations (SSOs) are groups responsible for setting
quality and interoperability standards for the devices and products consumers know
and love. Two paradigmatic examples are cell phones and Wi-Fi.8 These products
could not function the way they do without conforming to certain uniform
technological standards. Indeed, it has been said that “without standardization there
wouldn’t be a modern economy.”9
7. Timothy Muris, Biden FRAND Policy Will Help Protect Competition, LAW360 ( Jan. 27, 2022,
6:41 PM ), https://www.law360.com/articles/1459379 [ https://perma.cc/WV42-LBHZ ].
8. See Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Ignorance over Innovation: Why Misunderstanding Standard
Setting Organizations Will Hinder Technological Progress, 56 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 159, 169 (2018 )
( “Whether you have a phone made by Apple or Google or Samsung, you will be able to talk and text
other people, regardless of what brand of smart phone they use. You will be able to access Wi-Fi via
the router in your house, not [ sic] matter what company manufactures that router—and you will be
able to hop onto Wi-Fi hotspots at the local library, coffee shop, and many other places. When not on
Wi-Fi, you will be able to access the LTE network, whether you use Verizon, T-Mobile, or another cell
phone service provider. Technology standards make all these things, and so many other aspects of
modern life, possible.” ).
9. James Surowiecki, Turn of the Century, WIRED ( Jan. 1, 2002, 12:00 PM ), http://
www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.01/standards.html [ https://perma.cc/FQT6-WXX5 ].
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SSOs endeavor to select the technologies that will be most beneficial for
the industry.10 The process includes meetings with industry experts as well as
pre-standard (ex ante or upstream) competition among the innovators who are each
advocating for the selection of their own technology.11 During this period of
upstream competition, monopoly pricing is not yet a problem.12 But once a standard
is set, the selected technology is essential to compliance with the standard, so,
assuming it was patented, it becomes what is known as an SEP. In other words, “if
it is impossible to design a product that complies with a particular technical standard
without infringing the claims of a particular patent, that patent is ‘essential’ to the
practice of that standard.”13 Once a patent is anointed as an SEP, there arises a risk
of patent holdup.
B. Patent Holdup
Patent holdup is when an SEP holder either refuses to license its technology
or charges excessive royalties for its technology after others have already made
“substantial investments” in developing and adopting the relevant standard.14
To help prevent patent holdup, SSOs employ a two-step process that requires
(1) disclosure of all patents and (2) agreement by the patent owner to license its
patent on FRAND terms.15 These requirements evolved as a means to balance the
interests of SEP holders against those of end-product proprietors.16 That is, they
protect competition and curb monopolistic behavior.
It is worth noting that lawful monopolies do not implicate antitrust law, but
illegal monopolies do.17 A legal monopoly does not result in patent holdup because
10. .See, e.g., Developing Standards, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, https://standards.ieee.org/
develop/index.html [ https://perma.cc/6GEC-94H5 ] ( last visited Mar. 25, 2022 ) ( “The IEEE
standards development process is rooted in consensus, due process, openness, right to appeal and
balance . . . . In particular, the IEEE operates in active agreement with the WTO principle that
standards should not create unnecessary obstacles to trade, and whenever appropriate, should specify
requirements in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics.” ).
11. See, e.g., id.
12. See Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Recognizing the
Procompetitive Potential of Royalty Discussions in Standard Setting, Remarks Prepared for
Standardization and the Law: Developing the Golden Mean for Global Trade at Stanford University 3
( Sept. 23, 2005 ), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras/050923stanford.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
7WCN-TYLP ] (“[ B ]efore lock in—or ‘ex ante’—technologies compete to be the standard, and no
patent-holder can demand more than a competitive royalty rate. After lock in—or ‘ex post’—the owner
of the chosen technology may have the power to charge users supra-competitive royalty rates—rates
that may ultimately be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.” ).
13. Interview by Patrick H.J. Hughes with John D. Carlin, Pat. Att’y, Venable LLP ( Sept. 23,
2020 ), 2020 IPDBRF 0115.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 58 C.J.S. Monopolies § 16 (2021 ) ( “Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibiting
monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize, acts or practices that result in the acquisition or
maintenance of monopoly power are not in violation unless they represent something more than the
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it will have been achieved and maintained through competition on the merits.18
Competition for inclusion in a standard includes not only superior product but also
a bona fide intent to honor one’s FRAND commitment, which prevents the
unlawful acquisition of monopoly power.19
An illegal monopoly, on the other hand, results when a patent holder
deceptively influences an SSO to set a technological standard that requires use of
its patent by agreeing to license the patent on FRAND terms but then violates that
FRAND agreement by charging high or discriminatory licensing fees.20 The ones
being charged these above-FRAND licensing fees are the implementers and cannot
at this point simply opt to use a different piece of technology.21 Once a piece of
patented technology is included in a standard and the industry moves in that
direction, the standard becomes entrenched, making it too costly for the industry to
go back and pick a new standard. Those costs are called switching costs.22 Switching
costs, coupled with the exclusionary power of the patent, are what create a
monopoly for the SEP holder and eliminate other options for the implementers.23
Obtaining and using this type of monopoly power through deception on an SSO
has been known as patent holdup, and antitrust law has historically been involved
to prevent such anticompetitive conduct.24 Even in high-tech industry cases not
conduct of business that is part of the normal competitive process, and must be actions that are taken
for no legitimate business reasons. A defendant must be guilty of illegal conduct to foreclose
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, such that liability turns on
whether valid business reasons can explain a defendant’s actions. Monopoly power is not condemned
by the Act only when it was unlawfully obtained. Even a lawful monopolist may be in violation when
seeking to extend or exploit its monopoly in a manner not contemplated by its authorization. The use
of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive
advantage, or to destroy a competitor is unlawful.” ( footnotes omitted ) ).
18. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 ( 3d Cir. 2007 ) ( “Anticompetitive
conduct may take a variety of forms, but it is generally defined as conduct to obtain or maintain
monopoly power as a result of competition on some basis other than the merits.” ( citing LePage’s Inc.
v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 147 ( 3d Cir. 2003 ) ( en banc ) ) ).
19. See id. at 305.
20. See id. at 312 n.5 ( “[ E]ven if the SSO . . . itself is not corrupt, the subversion of an SSO by
a single industry player or by a limited subset of SSO members can result in anticompetitive
outcomes . . . . [ B]y hijacking or capturing an SSO, a single industry player can magnify its power and
effectuate anticompetitive effects on the market in question.” ).
21. Implementers are technology developers and manufacturers of products conforming with
a standard—the companies whose products incorporate the SEPs.
22. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476 (1992 ) (“[ A] seller
profitably could maintain supracompetitive prices in the aftermarket if the switching costs were high
relative to the increase in service prices, and the number of locked-in customers were high relative to
the number of new purchasers.” ).
23. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10
( W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013 ) ( “[ T]he ‘essence of hold-up’ is that while ex ante competition constrains
what a patent holder can obtain for access to its patent, ex post, the technology in the standard does not
face that competition.” ( citing trial testimony of Richard Schmalensee ).
24. See Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 314 ( “Deception in a consensus-driven private standard-setting
environment harms the competitive process by obscuring the costs of including proprietary technology
in a standard and increasing the likelihood that patent rights will confer monopoly power on the patent
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specifically dealing with patent holdup, courts have held that deception is monopoly
conduct.25 Those who reject patent holdup’s receptiveness to antitrust scrutiny do
not deny that deception can be monopoly conduct26 but attempt to evade such
scrutiny by suggesting that the “particular type of purported deception in the
standard-setting context” is different—that it is a foreseeable and therefore
immaterial kind of deception.27
But undermining antitrust law—a successful deterrent to wrongdoing—will
invite more wrongdoing. Without antitrust laws enforcing the integrity of the
standard-setting processes, consumers will lose some of the benefits provided by
those processes. For one, SSOs may opt for non-patented technology in order to
avoid patent holdup,28 potentially giving consumers less-than-ideal products. Patent
owners, in turn, could be driven to take their chances in a standards war29 rather
than participate in a standard-selection process that might prefer non-patented
technologies. Another possibility is that even if SSOs continued their current
competitive selection processes, the FRAND commitment would have no teeth.
Then, high and discriminatory royalty rates would become even more common,
resulting in market delays, fewer implementers, more concentrated wealth,
concentrated power, higher prices, and fewer choices for consumers.30 Maintaining

holder.” ( citing Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, at 4 ( Fed. Trade Comm’n, Aug. 2, 2006 ), 2006 WL 2330117
at *19 ) ); Wi-LAN Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 382 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1023 ( S.D. Cal. 2019 ) ( “Courts have
recognized that fraudulent FRAND declarations that are used to induce SSOs to adopt standards
essential patents can be monopoly conduct for the purposes of establishing a Section 2 claim.” ( citing
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2011 WL 4948567, at *4 ( N.D. Cal. Oct. 18,
2011 ) ) ); Rsch. In Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 796 ( N.D. Tex. 2008 ) ( denying
a motion to dismiss a Section 2 claim because the plaintiff alleged that the defendant “obtained its
position of power in the market not as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen or historic
accident, but by misrepresenting its intentions” ); Apple Inc., 2011 WL 4948567, at *4 ( “Thus,
intentionally false promises to SSOs regarding licenses with FRAND terms can give rise to actionable
claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.” ).
25. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 76–77 (D.C. Cir. 2001 ) ( en banc ) ( per
curium ) ( holding that Section 2 liability was based on Microsoft’s intentionally deceiving developers
into thinking applications they developed to run on Microsoft systems would be cross-platform ).
26. Statement of Interest, supra note 1, at 1 n.2 ( citing Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 76–77 )
( “Deception, of course, can ground a valid Section 2 claim in certain circumstances.” ).
27. Id.; see also id. at 15 ( “Even if the patent holder plans to maximize its licensing rates until a
court or other tribunal determines those rates are above FRAND . . . [ its ] failure to be forthcoming
about that intent . . . does not constitute a material deception.” ).
28. See Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 305 ( noting that, in order to deter unlawful monopolies, SSOs
might choose “nonproprietary technologies for inclusion in the standard” ); Christopher R. Leslie,
The DOJ’s Defense of Deception: Antitrust Law’s Role in Protecting the Standard-Setting Process, 98
OR. L. REV. 379, 389 ( 2020 ) ( “The [ FRAND ] obligation, however, must be binding, because if
FRAND commitments are neither credible nor enforceable, SSOs may adopt suboptimal standards in
an effort to minimize the risk of patent holdup.” ).
29. “Standards wars” are competitions for market-selected standards as opposed to collectively
set standards. See Osenga, supra note 8, at 169. They are discussed in detail in Section III.D of this Note.
30. See DRAFT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 6, at 4 ( “Opportunistic conduct by SEP holders
to obtain, through the threat of exclusion, higher compensation for SEPs than they would have been
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antitrust enforcement, on the other hand, promotes lawful competition and
innovation, as this Note will explore.
C. Obtaining a Monopoly Through Deception on an SSO Is Not Competition
on the Merits
SSOs are comprised of implementers, patent holders, technical experts, and
other stakeholders, many of whom compete with each other.31 Thus, SSOs utilize
competition at the upstream, standard-selection level to choose the most efficient
and beneficial technology for their members.32 Critics argue that the existence of
this upstream competition means all SEP monopolies are achieved through
competition on the merits and therefore antitrust laws should not be at play.33 This
could make sense if there were no FRAND commitments or deception on the
SSOs, but it ignores the fact that the patented products would never have been
selected if there were not FRAND commitments attached.34 When competing for
selection, misrepresenting one’s intent to honor a FRAND commitment is akin to
misrepresenting the capability of the product. Both intent to honor a FRAND
commitment and the product’s capabilities are important factors in determining
which products get chosen and which do not. Thus, such deception in standards
selection is anticompetitive. It permits an “inefficient acquisition of market power”
that “subverts the competitive process” by keeping implementers unaware of the
terms on which a technology will be licensed.35
able to negotiate prior to standardization, can deter investment in and delay introduction of
standardized products, raise prices, and ultimately harm consumers and small businesses.” ).
31. See Osenga, supra note 8, at 165 (“SSOs are ‘voluntary collectives in which representatives
from multiple private companies, who are often competitors of each other, work together to establish
technology standards.’” ( quoting Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, FRANDs Forever: Standards, Patent
Transfers, and Licensing Commitments, 89 Ind. L. Rev 1, 4 ( 2009 ) ) ).
32. See, e.g., Developing Standards, supra note 10.
33. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div., Broke . . . but
Not No More: Opening Remarks—Innovation Policy and the Role of Standards, IP, and Antitrust,
Prepared Remarks for LeadershIP Virtual Series ( Sept. 10, 2020 ) [ hereinafter Delrahim, Broke],
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarksleadership-virtual-series#_ftnref1 [ https://perma.cc/3BK5-TUJ6 ] ( “The competitive process in this
context takes place in the negotiations between implementers and patent holders. Negotiating in the
shadow of dubious antitrust liability is not only unnecessary, it dramatically shifts bargaining power
between patent holders and implementers in a way that distorts the incentives for real competition on
the merits through innovation. Giving implementers the threat of treble damages in antitrust increases
the perverse likelihood of ‘hold-out,’ which is the other side of the ‘hold-up’ coin. Of course, none of
this undermines the importance of the negotiations that took place at the time that an [ SSO ] selected
competing technologies for inclusion in the standard.” ).
34. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 313 ( 3d Cir. 2007 ) ( “A firm’s
FRAND commitment, therefore, is a factor—and an important factor—that the [ SSO] will consider
in evaluating the suitability of a given proprietary technology vis-a-vis competing technologies.” ( citing
Brief of Amici Curiae The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. et al. in Support of
Neither Party at 9, Broadcom, 501 F.3d 297 (No. 06-4292 ), 2006 WL 6900963 ) ).
35. Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro & Theresa Sullivan, Standard Setting, Patents, and
Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 609 ( 2007 ).
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The market power at issue here does not apply to all patents or to lawful SEPs
for that matter. For one, not all patents confer a monopoly. When people (or even
courts)36 use the word “monopoly” to refer to patent rights in a non-SEP invention,
that is typically a misnomer.37 The distinction between a true monopoly and general
patent rights is important because, in patent holdup, antitrust law is not concerned
with the lawful exclusion from competition that would be granted by a patent or
with the lawful exclusion that results from a standard.38 Antitrust law is, however,
concerned with deterring and remedying the unlawful exclusion that results from
anticompetitive violations of FRAND agreements.39
II. RELEVANCE
A. Undeterred Patent Holdup Breaks Down the Integrity of the Standard-Selection Process
Although patent holdup does occur, it is at least partially deterred by the risk
of an antitrust lawsuit, which maintains integrity in the standard-selection process.
SSOs require this integrity in order to continue providing significant and reliable
services—namely, developing and adopting the standards on which industries and
consumers rely. Deterrence of patent holdup is incredibly important because,
without a reliable selection process in which patent holders can be trusted to
maintain FRAND royalty rates, holdup slows the whole system, harming innovation

36. E.g., Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, 485 F. Supp. 3d 712, 733 (N.D. Tex. 2020 ) ( “A
patent holder, of course, has a lawful monopoly to license its patent.” ), vacated and remanded, 27 F.4th
326 (5th Cir. 2022 ).
37. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44 (2006 ) (“[ T]he vast majority of
academic literature recognizes that a patent does not necessarily confer market power.” ); see also
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY, CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE & MICHAEL
A. CARRIER, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 4.02 (3d ed. 2017 ) ( “In sum, coverage of one’s product with an
intellectual property right does not confer a monopoly . . . . ” ).
38. On the inherent exclusivity of patent law, see Liivak, supra note 1, at 1643 (“Patent law’s
broad exclusionary rule is one of its defining features.” ). On the inherent exclusivity of standards, see
Research in Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 796 ( N.D. Tex. 2008 ) ( noting that the
opinion in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 ( 1988 ), “implies that,
without safeguards against bias, the very existence of standards is inherently anti-competitive” ). See
also Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Law and
Patent Licensing in the New Wild West, Prepared Remarks for IAM’S Patent Licensing Conference 6
( Sept. 18, 2018 ), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1095011/download [ https://perma.cc/
F5UK-UCVA] ( “In the context of legitimate standard setting, the collective decision to incorporate a
patented technology into a standard necessarily involves the ‘exclusion’ of rival technologies.” ).
39. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493, at *6
( N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012 ) ( “Moreover, a number of courts have recognized a legal distinction
between a normal patent—to which antitrust market power is generally not conferred on the patent
owner, and a patent incorporated into a standard—to which antitrust market power may be conferred
on the patent owner.” ).
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and consumers alike.40 A former Joint Policy Statement issued in 2013 by the DOJ
and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) had noted that implementers
might “postpone or avoid making commitments to standardized technology
or . . . make inefficient investments in developing and implementing a standard” as
a means of protecting themselves against patent holdup.41 Moreover, it stated that
“[c]onsumers of products implementing the standard could also be harmed to the
extent that the holdup generates unwarranted higher royalties and those royalties
are passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.”42
The 2013 Joint Policy Statement was withdrawn as part of a push toward
undermining antitrust law in the context of technological standard setting.43 In
December of 2019, it was replaced with the current Joint Policy Statement by the
DOJ, USPTO, and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which
advised against antitrust scrutiny in the FRAND-licensing context so that it would
be easier for SEP holders to seek injunctions.44 Just two years later, the current Joint
Policy Statement began undergoing draft revisions in an effort to return to previous
policy guidance.45
During the course of these policy shifts, some discourse called patent holdup
a “radical theory” that needed to be reconsidered.46 Other arguments went so far as
to suggest that integrity is not necessary in the standard-setting process—that, on
the contrary, deception should be considered par for the course.47 Specifically, in
the Statement of Interest submitted by the 2020 DOJ in Continental Automotive
Systems, Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, it was argued that
[e]ven if the patent holder plans to maximize its licensing rates until a court
or other tribunal determines those rates are above FRAND, that
contingency is foreseeable [to] the SSO with a term as flexible as
40. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10
( W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013 ) ( “In addition to harming firms that are forced to pay higher royalties,
hold-up also harms consumers to the extent that those excess costs are passed onto them.” ).
41. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., POLICY STATEMENT ON
REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND
COMMITMENTS 4 ( 2013 ), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1118381/download [ https://
perma.cc/87JL-KGSW ] ( withdrawn ).
42. Id.
43. See James Arkin, Tillis Slams DOJ’s Plan to Revise Policy on Essential Patents, LAW360
( Jan. 21, 2022, 7:22 PM ), https://www.law360.com/articles/1457597/tillis-slams-doj-s-plan-torevise-policy-on-essential-patents [ https://perma.cc/D3WU-G3G4 ] ( “The Trump policy replaced the
previous stance of U.S. competition enforcers, which was that patent holders could face antitrust claims
from the government if they sought court injunctions against use of their patents without engaging in
what enforcers believed were sufficient efforts to negotiate a licensing deal on fair, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms.” ).
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. E.g., Bryan Koenig, DOJ Antitrust Head Touts Pushback on ‘Radical’ IP Theory, LAW360
( Sept. 10, 2020, 8:03 PM ), https://www.law360.com/articles/1307302/doj-antitrust-head-toutspushback-on-radical-ip-theory [ https://perma.cc/BL73-RDPD ].
47. See, e.g., Statement of Interest, supra note 1, at 15.
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“FRAND.” A patent holder’s failure to be forthcoming about that intent,
therefore, does not constitute a material deception.48
Such a scenario is exactly the type of behavior that federal courts have
recognized as anticompetitive.49 And logic would dictate that if it were foreseeable
for patent holders to lie about their intent to charge above-FRAND royalties, then
SSOs would not bother with FRAND commitments in the first place.
1. Evidence of Patent Holdup
Another common attack on the use of antitrust law to combat patent holdup
is that patent holdup is but a theory lacking empirical evidence.50 But the evidence
is not lacking—patent holdup empirically occurs, and the following is a sampling of
real-world examples.
First is an extensive study of court dockets from all U.S. cases filed from 2010
to 2019 that assert or challenge SEPs.51 In the study, researchers from Santa Clara
University and Toulouse School of Economics found “evidence of opportunistic
behavior” by SEP licensors in approximately seventy-five percent of the assertions
made in court.52 The study measured behaviors that have all been associated with
patent holdup, including claiming discriminatory licensing terms, waiting until after
a standard was adopted before disclosing relevant patents, and seeking to enjoin
implementers from creating products that follow the standard.53 As stated by the
researchers, “[w]hile it is true that many of our measures of opportunistic behavior
are based on allegations by accused infringers, we strictly limit our data to allegations
of strategic behavior that are supported by specific factual statements.”54 Thus, this
research helps illustrate the frequency of patent holdup.
Second, evidence of patent holdup can be seen in findings from the University
of Tokyo, where researchers analyzed data gathered from after a 2011 auction of

48. Id.
49. See Amphastar Pharms., Inc. v. Momenta Pharms., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 222, 230
( D. Mass. 2018 ) (“Intentional misrepresentations designed to deceive a standard-setting organization
can constitute an antitrust violation.” ).
50. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1313, 1338–39 (2017 ) ( “Remarkably, all available empirical evidence fails to confirm these
widely endorsed theories. This mismatch between theory and evidence demands that we revisit the
explicit and implicit assumptions behind those theories; upon closer review, it is clear that those
assumptions are unlikely to be typically realized in real-world technology markets.” ); Osenga, supra note
8, at 172 (“The existence and extent of patent hold-up and royalty stacking have been questioned by
numerous commentators due to a lack of evidence and even evidence to the contrary.” ).
51. Brian J. Love, Yassine Lefouili & Christian Helmers, Do Standard-Essential Patent
Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence from U.S. District Court Dockets 41 ( Toulouse Sch. of
Econ., Working Paper No. 20-1160, 2020 ), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3727085 [ https://perma.cc/
HZ8V-PTYN ].
52. Id.
53. Id. at 11 tbl.1.
54. Id. at 41.
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the patent portfolio of bankrupt-telecommunications-company Nortel Networks.55
Companies like Apple, Microsoft, and Sony purchased valuable patents from the
auction, and companies like Google and Intel were losing bidders.56 Empirical
evidence from the relevant players’ post-auction patenting activity supported the
researchers’ hypothesis that “a firm’s patent purchase deters its rival firm’s
development of relevant technologies to that patent if the patent covers crucial
technological input for its rival’s market operation.”57 This, they point out, can
“aggravate ex-post patent holdup and increase the cost of innovation.”58 Of course,
the ones who develop these “relevant technologies” are the implementers.59 The
evidence of Google and Intel’s reluctance to invest in implementing technologies
shows that they fear the sunk costs of patent holdup. A rational company like
Google or Intel would not calculate its behavior to minimize the risk of something
that never happens.
Interestingly, the study also found that though the auction-losing firms were
“deterred from developing technologies relevant to the Nortel patents immediately
after the auction, these firms’ development of such technologies recovered a few
years later.”60 The study offers an explanation for this recovery: the auction bidders
were all large firms, capable of developing long-term strategies to deter patent
holdup.61 One primary strategy is purchasing other, third-party-owned SEPs
for themselves, which they can then cross-license to the auction-winning firms so
that neither side would have more leverage than the other.62 Indeed, the study
points out that both Google and Intel adopted a defensive patent-acquisition
strategy—Google by acquiring Motorola Mobility with its patent portfolio, and
Intel by purchasing 1,400 telecommunications patents from Prowave, Inc.63 But
the existence of this type of strategy does not solve the holdup problem because it
is not available to small or midsized companies who cannot acquire as many
SEPs for cross-licensing. The next example touches on this very point—that the
cross-licensing strategy is not a solution for many companies.

55. Seokbeom Kwon, How Does Patent Transfer Affect Innovation of Firms?,
TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE, May 2020, at 1, 1, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
339230418_How_does_patent_transfer_affect_innovation_of_firms [ https://perma.cc/68YU9PBB ].
56. Id. at 6.
57. Id. at 1.
58. Id.
59. Id. On the role of implementer vis-à-vis SEP holder, it is worth noting that these are not
mutually exclusive; firms capable of cross-licensing will be both licensor and licensee, depending on
the respective technologies involved.
60. Id. at 16.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Third, a personal account was given by Mr. Allen Lo, Director of Intellectual
Property at Juniper Networks, a midsized company64 that develops and markets
networking products.65 Mr. Lo discussed his experience with patent holdup as one
in which the company being offered the license “really has no leverage to negotiate
anything that’s fair and reasonable . . . because it doesn’t have a mature patent
portfolio and because it has to implement these standards.”66 The effect is that the
patent holder essentially gets “to dictate what those [F]RAND terms are going to
be.”67 In his words, because of the leverage disparity, if an implementer asks what
exactly FRAND means, the patent holder responds with, “you can wait a year or
two until I come knocking on your door and I’ll tell you what that means.”68 When
the patent owner later approaches the company for royalties, the company is no
longer in a position to negotiate.69 If the company rejects the dictated terms, then
the parties are in a holdup situation where the implementer could then face
“potential willful infringement damages, as well as the risk of an injunction.”70
Fourth, in Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., Motorola demanded royalties from
Microsoft in the amount of $6 to $8 per Xbox unit that used Motorola’s SEPs and
sought to exclude those consoles from entering the United States if these royalties
were not paid.71 When the court determined the actual FRAND rates for the various
SEPs, they were only $0.0055 to $0.195 per unit (less than $0.01 per unit to an upper
limit of $0.19 per unit).72 That means that, through patent holdup, Motorola was
seeking to charge royalties that were up to 1090 times higher than the appropriate
FRAND royalty.73
Fifth, in Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., LSI sought to exclude Realtek
products from entering the United States where those products included technology

64. JUNIPER NETWORKS, CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 5 ( 2019 ),
https://www.juniper.net/content/dam/www/assets/factsheet/us/en/juniper-corporate-citizenshipand-sustainability-report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/SC5N-YT5S] ( “Forbes’ list of America’s Best Midsize
Employers 2019” ( emphasis added )).
65. Matt Stump, Juniper Acquisitions Yield Small-System CMTS Gear, MULTICHANNEL NEWS
( Oct. 6, 2002 ), https://www.nexttv.com/news/juniper-acquisitions-yield-small-system-cmts-gear148732 [ https://perma.cc/W3UR-2VZK ].
66.
Allen M. Lo, Dir. of Intell. Prop., Juniper Networks, Remarks at the United States
Department of Justice Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission Hearings on Competition
and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge Based Economy: Standard Setting 243
( Apr. 18, 2002 ), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/competition-iplaw-policy-knowledge-based-economy-hearings/020418trans.pdf [ https://perma.cc/39JF-AAWJ ].
67. Id.
68. Id. at 292.
69. Id. at 293.
70. Id.
71. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc. No. C10-1823, 2013 WL 2111217, at *99
( W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013 ).
72. Id. at *101.
73. See id.
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covered by two of LSI’s SEPs.74 It then offered to license those SEPs to Realtek on
“terms that would have required Realtek to pay LSI a royalty in excess of the selling
price of Realtek’s products.”75 Royalties above 100% are obviously inherently
unreasonable.76 The court determined that to be in compliance with its FRAND
commitment, LSI could charge a royalty of no more than 0.07% or 0.12% of
Realtek’s U.S. sales (depending on which of the two patents at issue was being
utilized).77 Because it had demanded over 100%, that was at least 834 times higher
than the appropriate royalty rate.78
Sixth, in TCL Communication Technology Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM
Ericsson, the parties had been engaged in renegotiating license fees for Ericsson’s
2G, 3G, and 4G cellular technology SEP portfolios because previous licenses were
about to expire.79 In a bench trial, the district court noted that the rates Ericsson
offered “evolved over the course of the parties’ negotiations.”80 For example, its
first 4G offer was a royalty rate of 3% for 4G handsets and tablets.81 After TCL
filed the lawsuit, Ericsson reduced the 4G rate to 2% and then again to 1.5%.82 The
court then calculated that a proper FRAND rate was 0.45% for the 4G technology.83
Thus, the amount that Ericsson demanded prior to initiation of the lawsuit was
nearly seven times higher than the court-calculated rate.84 On appeal it was
ultimately determined that Ericsson had not waived its right to a jury trial and was
entitled to have the FRAND rate re-decided by a jury, but the court of
appeals did not suggest that the district court had erred in its calculations.85
Thus, although the issue was remanded for recalculation by a jury,86 the court’s
FRAND determination shows that the patent owner was demanding inordinately
higher-than-FRAND royalties.
Seventh and infamously, Rambus, Inc., a licensor of computer memory-chip
technology and member of the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (an
SSO), became aware of an interchangeability standard to be implemented by the
74. Realtek Semiconductor, Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-3451, 2014 WL 2738216, at *2
( N.D. Cal. June 16, 2014 ).
75. Plaintiff Realtek Semiconductor Corp.’s Opposition to Defendants LSI Corp. & Agere
Systems LLC’s Motion to Dismiss, Realtek Semiconductor Corp., 2014 WL 2738216 (No. C-12-3451 ),
2012 WL 5187083 at *5 ( emphasis added ).
76. See id.
77. Realtek, 2014 WL 2738216, at *2.
78. See id.
79. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. CV 15-2370,
2018 WL 4488286 ( C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2018 ), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 943 F.3d 1360 ( Fed. Cir. 2019 ).
80. Id. at *3.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *51.
84. Id.
85. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 943 F.3d 1360,
1375 ( Fed. Cir. 2019 ).
86. Id. at 1376.
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SSO, then amended its patent applications to cover the standard.87 However,
Rambus concealed the existence of these applications from the SSO, thus
influencing the content of the standard.88 After the SSO unwittingly selected some
of Rambus’s patented technologies as part of the standard, Rambus was able to
charge a royalty of 3.5% for the incorporated patents, as opposed to a 0.75% rate
for its patents that were not incorporated in a standard.89 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) ruled that Rambus had committed antitrust violations, but, in
Rambus Inc. v. FTC, the court of appeals overturned the FTC’s ruling and held in
favor of Rambus.90 That holding begged a number of questions. First, the court
reasoned that the SSO would have adopted the same standard anyway.91 But if that
were true, why would Rambus have felt the need to conceal the existence of its
patents? Second, the court held that failing to be bound by a FRAND agreement is
not an antitrust violation, as charging higher prices is not in itself monopoly conduct
because it does not keep competitors out of the market.92 But even if charging
higher prices is not monopoly conduct, what about using deception to attain
monopoly power and avoid a FRAND commitment?93 Third, the court held that
the resulting higher prices were actually procompetitive because “high prices and
constrained output tend to attract competitors, not to repel them.”94 But did this
ignore the fact that the particular technology at issue was already locked in by a
standard, meaning any further competition was foreclosed by switching costs?95
Eighth, after a “highly visible” lawsuit, BlackBerry developer Research
in Motion paid $612.5 million to the patent owner of one component of its

87. Herbert Hovenkamp, Patent Deception in Standard Setting: The Case for Antitrust Policy 6
( July 20, 2010 ) (unpublished manuscript ), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1138002 [ https://perma.cc/
A2VC-NMWU ] ( “According to the FTC Rambus also took advantage of its membership in
JEDEC to formulate additional divisional applications written on the very technology that JEDEC
was in the process of developing, all of which would obtain the original 1990 priority date under
PTO continuance rules.” ); Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1107 ( Fed. Cir. 2003 )
( Prost, J., dissenting ) ( “Rambus continued to attend JEDEC meetings for three more years, watching
the SDRAM standard evolve and then amending its patent applications to try to cover features of
the standard.” ).
88. See Hovenkamp, supra note 87, at 8–9 ( discussing how a defendant’s failure to disclose its
patent applications to an SSO can “result[ ] in the adoption of the defendant’s technology even though
another technology would have been preferred had it been known that the defendant’s technology was not
in the public domain” ( emphasis added ) ).
89. Mark R. Patterson, Commentary, Antitrust and the Costs of Standard-Setting: A Commentary
on Teece and Sherry, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1995, 2001 n.33 ( 2003 ).
90. See Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 ( D.C. Cir. 2008 ).
91. See id. at 466–67.
92. Id. at 466.
93. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 76–77 ( D.C. Cir. 2001 ) ( per curiam )
( holding that deception is monopoly conduct ).
94. Rambus, 522 F.3d at 466.
95. In other words, although the prospect of charging high prices may lure competing
technologies into a typical market, there is no room for such competition once a standard has been set;
the exclusionary nature of a standard is too high of a barrier to entry.
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then-ubiquitous BlackBerry device to settle further litigation and avoid any further
risk of injunction, despite the fact that the jury had awarded royalty damages of only
$33.5 million.96 That is an eighteen-to-one difference between the settlement amount
and the jury award, which begs the question of why Research in Motion would have
been willing to pay so much to continue using the component. Although the large
settlement amount may have included additional forward-looking royalties, those
alone would not have justified the gap.97 Scholars have explained cases like this by
pointing out that in patent holdup “it is not the underlying value of the patented
technology, but the cost to the defendant of switching technologies midstream, that
is driving the high royalties being paid.” 98 It is therefore “common for patent
defendants to settle cases for more money than the patentee could have won in
damages and license fees, simply to avoid the threat of an injunction shutting down
the core product.”99
Ninth, according to a study entitled “3G Cellular Standards and Patents,”
hundreds of standard-essential 3G inventions (equating to thousands of
standard-essential patents once patenting the same invention in multiple countries
was taken into account) belonged to forty-one different companies.100 These patents
related only to internet functionality and therefore would not account for the many
other technology costs that go into developing and manufacturing a cell phone.101
Yet, royalties on a cell phone implementing these patents have been estimated to be
as high as thirty percent prior to any cross-licensing offsets.102 This is patent holdup
in action because it cannot be FRAND to pay thirty percent of the sales price of an
independently invented product for mere internet connectivity royalties alone.
Tenth, testimony from the Associate General Counsel of Broadcom Inc.,
Mr. David Djavaherian, in In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, stated
that holdup “was not merely theoretical for Broadcom.”103 It had seen a number
of entities “driving up costs in the industry” by attempting to assert patents essential
to a wireless computer networking standard (namely, the 802.11 standard
established by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)).104

96. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991,
2009 & n.36 ( 2007 ) ( citing NTP, Inc. v. Rsch. in Motion, Ltd., No. 01 CV 767, 2003 WL 23100881, at
*1 ( E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2003 ), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 392 F.3d 1336 ( Fed. Cir. 2004 ), and
aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 418 F.3d 1282 ( Fed. Cir. 2005 )).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2008–09.
99. Id.
100. David J. Goodman & Robert A. Myers, 3G Cellular Standards and Patents, IEEE
WIRELESSCOM 2005, June 13, 2005 , https://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2009/03/wirelesscom2005.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/2N3R-XR5A ].
101. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 96, at 2026–27.
102. Id.
103. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *9
( N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013 ).
104. Id.
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Moreover, in an August 5, 2011, letter to the FTC, Broadcom wrote,
“‘From Broadcom’s perspective, far from being a ‘rare disease,’ patent ambush
is widespread.’”105
The foregoing compilation is not exhaustive, nor does it necessarily reflect the
most egregious examples of patent holdup. But to the extent these real-world
examples are less than voluminous, the following points explain why. First, “if
companies understand the risk of holdup, they will avoid or mitigate it.”106 Second,
“quantifying the frequency and magnitude of actual patent holdups is very difficult
as a practical matter” and is not the best way to assess the problem.107 This is partly
because researchers rarely have access to confidential patent-licensing terms, and
even when they do view such ex post pricing, they do not typically have access to
what the ex ante price would have been, so they cannot draw a comparison.108 Third,
antitrust enforcement of FRAND commitments involving deception on the SSO
serves as a deterrent to wrongdoing.109 To argue that industries simply do not have
a problem with patent holdup is not only to ignore the cases, anecdotes, and
research cited above but also to ignore the fact that antitrust law is doing its
job—the reason there is not more evidence of holdup is because SEP holders do not
wish to risk treble damages.110
Additionally, some of the commentators who argue that patent holdup is not
a real-world problem may be funded or otherwise connected to companies with a
vested interest in patent holdup.111 For example, one scholar comically pointed out
how absurd the backlash can sometimes be by highlighting a study that
purport[ed] to find no innovation loss from patent holdup in software by
declaring bananas and sugar to be “textbook holdup industries” and
finding that prices fall faster for technologies subject to holdup than they
do in bananas or sugar, despite the rather different characteristics of

105. Id. ( quoting Letter from Broadcom Corp. to Fed. Trade Comm’n ( Aug. 5, 2011)
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/request-comments-andannouncement-workshop-standard-setting-issues-project-no.p111204-00053%C2%A0/00053-80206.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/ZD3B-VF9V] ).
106. Love, Lefouili & Helmers, supra note 51, at 6–7.
107. Carl Shapiro & Mark A. Lemley, The Role of Antitrust in Preventing Patent Holdup, 168
U. PA. L. REV. 2019, 2039 ( 2020 ).
108. Id.
109. Leslie, supra note 28, at 413.
110. Successful antitrust plaintiffs are awarded treble damages. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN,
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, HOWARD A. SHELANSKI & CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, ANTITRUST LAW,
POLICY, AND PROCEDURE 177–79 ( 8th ed. 2019 ) ( citing Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 ).
111. See, e.g., Shapiro & Lemley, supra note 106, at 2041 ( “So far as we can tell, the vast majority
of these papers have been funded by Qualcomm and other patent holders seeking to weaken the
institutions designed to control patent holdup, increase their leverage in licensing negotiations, and thus
increase their ability to monetize their patents.” ).
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bananas and smartphones and the absence of any systematic holdup in
bananas or sugar.112
Having established that patent holdup is a real-world problem, the next
Section takes a deeper look at why it implicates antitrust law.
B. Deterrence of Patent Holdup Is In-Line with the Goals of Antitrust Law
Antitrust laws have advanced two main goals throughout history: one is
enhancing economic efficiency and consumer welfare,113 and the other is promoting
a balance of sociopolitical power amongst businesses.114 Additionally, a third, more
modern goal of antitrust law is gaining traction—antitrust enforcement as a tool to
achieve racial equity.115 Preserving the beneficial institution of standard selection is
important because it furthers both of the historic goals that antitrust law cares about,
and perhaps the more modern one as well. Moreover, the solution to the problem
of patent holdup is simple and administrable and is something antitrust law is good
at—deterring the acquisition of unlawful monopoly power.
1. Enhancing Economic Efficiency and Consumer Welfare
Regarding the goal of enhancing economic efficiency and consumer welfare,
businesses are considered efficient when they are able to generate goods and
services at lower costs or increased value to consumers, and “this is true whether
the business unit is a competitor or a monopolist.”116 Incorporation in a standard
indeed risks conferring monopoly power on the owner of the selected patent, but
the exercise of such power is meant to be constrained by a FRAND agreement.117
As long as incorporation is achieved through truthful competition during the
selection process, this is considered a legal monopoly—albeit one that is constrained
by a FRAND commitment.118
112. Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1336 n.24
( 2015 ) ( citing Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, Patent Holdup: Do Patent Holders
Holdup Innovation? 2–3 ( Hoover IP2, Working Paper Series No. 14011, 2014 ), http://
www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/ip2-wp14011-paper.pdf [ https://perma.cc/NAD7-9W2Q ] ).
113. As used here, consumer welfare is defined as the value to the consumer that an
economy produces.
114. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 4, 15.
115. Morales, supra note 2( “[ Recent political ] alignment may signal a significant shift in
antitrust enforcement away from a pure efficiencies model.” ).
116. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
7–8 ( 1978 ).
117. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 312, 314 (3d Cir. 2007 ) ( “Private
standard setting occurs in a consensus-oriented environment, where participants rely on structural
protections, such as rules requiring the disclosure of [ patent rights ], to facilitate competition
and constrain the exercise of monopoly power . . . . Deception in a consensus-driven private
standard-setting environment harms the competitive process by . . . increasing the likelihood that patent
rights will confer monopoly power on the patent holder.” ).
118. See id. at 305 ( “[ T ]he FRAND commitments that [ SSOs] require[ ] of vendors [ are]
intended as a bulwark against unlawful monopoly . . . . ” ).
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In any event, standards contribute to economic efficiency and consumer
welfare by both lowering costs119 and making products more valuable to
consumers.120 Specifically, interoperability standards lower transaction costs, lower
design and installation costs, allow industries to avoid switching costs, and increase
information sharing and predictability, among other financial benefits.121 And
performance standards make products more valuable because consumers can rely
on them to “set minimum requirements for all products in a general product
category.”122 SSOs help maintain efficiency by requiring FRAND commitments
before selecting a standard that could confer monopoly power on the SEP holder.
This works by preventing the monopolist from doing what traditional monopolists
do—namely, raising price and reducing output.123 Raising price and reducing output
(or, in this context, raising royalties and reducing the number of licenses granted)
result in overcharging those who can and will pay more while denying access to

119. Indeed, technology costs have decreased over the last thirty years at an incredible pace. See
Roberto Saracco, A Never Ending Decrease of Technology Cost, IEEE FUTURE DIRECTIONS ( Oct. 18,
2017 ), https://cmte.ieee.org/futuredirections/2017/10/18/a-never-ending-decrease-of-technologycost/ [ https://perma.cc/X9QV-MXKT ] ( “Take storage. In 1971 storing 1 GB of data would have
cost 250 Million $ [ sic ] . . . now storing a GB on a hard drive costs less than 0.03$. In less than 50 years
the price went down 8 billion times!” ). This decrease is at least in part due to the coordination and
avoidance of duplicative investments that SSOs are able to provide.
120. See Osenga, supra note 8, at 160.
121. See id. at 163 ( “Interoperability and interconnectivity standards guarantee that standardcompliant products made by different companies are compatible with other products that also
incorporate the standard, regardless of the manufacturer.” ); GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURE COUNCIL,
FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF INTEROPERABILITY: HOW INTEROPERABILITY IN THE ELECTRIC POWER
I NDUSTRY W ILL B ENEFIT S TAKEHOLDERS F INANCIALLY 5 (2009 ) [ hereinafter G RID W ISE ,
FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF INTEROPERABILITY ], https://www.gridwiseac.org/pdfs/financial_
interoperability.pdf [ https://perma.cc/VPH2-9MQE].
122. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 33 n.1 ( 2007 )
[ hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N ], https://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
hearings/ip/222655.pdf [ https://perma.cc/WKZ4-CGZ3 ] ( citing Gregory Tassey, Standardization in
Technology-Based Markets, 29 RSCH. POL’Y 587, 589–90 ( 2000 ) ).
123. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 ( 3d Cir. 2007 ) ( “Monopoly
power is the ability to control prices and exclude competition in a given market. If a firm can profitably
raise prices without causing competing firms to expand output and drive down prices, that firm has
monopoly power.” ) (internal citations omitted ); Sam D. Johnson & A. Michael Ferrill, Defining
Competition: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Decisionmaking, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 583, 592 (1984 )
( “Whereas the purely competitive firm must take price as a parameter, and therefore will expand output
to the point where marginal cost is equal to the market price, a firm with monopoly power . . . can
expand sales only by lowering its price. Assuming that the firm with monopoly power cannot
discriminate in price between purchasers, the marginal revenue obtained from an additional sale will be
less than the price paid by the marginal purchaser because in order to make that additional sale, the
monopoly firm also must reduce its price to all customers, including those that would have purchased
even without the reduction in price. Thus, unlike the competitive firm, for whom price equals marginal
cost, price exceeds marginal cost for the firm with monopoly power.” ) ( emphasis omitted ).
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those who cannot or will not. This is the opposite of efficiency and is what happens
when SEP holders are allowed to play patent holdup.124
Patent holdup is, therefore, something that implicates the first goal of the
antitrust laws: enhancing economic value to the consumer by deterring and
punishing wrongdoing.
2. Promoting a Balance of Sociopolitical Power Amongst Businesses
Sociopolitical power imbalances, created by concentrated wealth, can
undermine democracy because giant monopolists carry too much political
influence.125 This may be seen with the former Associate Attorney General of the
Antitrust Division of the DOJ, Makan Delrahim, and his ties to chipmaker
Qualcomm. Prior to his confirmation on September 28, 2017, Delrahim was
Qualcomm’s outside counsel.126 During his approximately three-year tenure with
the DOJ, he vigorously promoted a pro-SEP-licensor (pro-Qualcomm) view that a
refusal to license SEPs should be per se legal, and that any FRAND violation should
not be subject to antitrust liability.127 This was seen in his department’s interference
with the FTC’s lawsuit against Qualcomm, which the FTC won at the district court
level, but Qualcomm won on appeal. That case centered around the issue of
Qualcomm’s refusal to grant SEP licenses to rival chip manufacturers.128 Though
the district court found that this refusal was “a violation of the antitrust duty to deal
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,” the court of appeal vacated such judgment
and held that the remedy for Qualcomm’s FRAND violations lies not in antitrust
law but in contract or tort law.129
It was at the appeal level that the DOJ interjected by filing its Statement of
Interest. While Delrahim himself was recused from participating in the Statement
of Interest due to his ties to Qualcomm, the Statement was nevertheless submitted
by his subordinates, and it articulated the same views he personally expressed in his

124. One counterargument to this proposition is that patent holdup ( i.e., raising royalty rates
and limiting licenses ) could almost never be the goal of an SEP holder because “the interests of the
patentee are almost always to license the patent; the patent is worthless to them otherwise.” Dirk Auer,
Geoffrey A. Manne, Julian Morris & Kristian Stout, The Deterioration of Appropriate Remedies in Patent
Disputes, FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV., Aug. 11, 2020, at 158, 163. But given that the profit-maximizing
price set by an SEP holder (i.e., one with monopoly power who cannot engage in price discrimination )
need not contemplate the broadest possible licensing scheme, it is able to embrace higher royalties for
those implementers who can and will pay them, to the exclusion of others. See Johnson & Ferrill, supra
note 122, at 592.
125. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 7.
126. Lee Gesmer, FTC and DOJ Face Off over Antitrust and FRAND Licensing in FTC
v. Qualcomm, MASS LAW BLOG ( Aug. 26, 2019 ), https://www.masslawblog.com/antitrust/ftc-anddoj-face-off-over-antitrust-and-frand-licensing-in-ftc-v-qualcomm-2/ [ https://perma.cc/9TR4-BS6K].
127. Id.
128. Hughes, supra note 13.
129. Id.
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many speeches.130 Editorialists called the DOJ’s interference in the FTC’s case
“absolutely unheard-of”131 and pointed out that the Delrahim DOJ was
“disproportionately more active filing amicus briefs than actually enforcing the
antitrust laws.”132 Others have added that, “[h]istorically, the division has
participated in outside cases on a very limited basis,” but under Delrahim—who
signed the filings personally—”the division [ ] promised to wade in more frequently
‘to help shape the development and application of antitrust law in the earliest stages
of private litigation.’”133
With the placement of Delrahim as the DOJ’s chief antitrust enforcer from
September 2017 through January 2021, Big-Tech companies had an ally on the
inside, even against bipartisan support for antitrust enforcement in the technology
industry.134 The most obvious effects of this can be seen in the dramatic decrease
in antitrust enforcement actions brought by the DOJ during Delrahim’s tenure, as
compared with the equally dramatic increase in DOJ involvement in third-party court
cases during this time.
The following data, taken directly from the DOJ’s website, confirm the above
statements. Antitrust enforcement case filings by the DOJ averaged 65.7 cases per
year from the year 2000 until Delrahim took office in late 2017, as compared with
only 43.5 enforcement cases per year from the time he took office until the end of
2020.135 Conversely, antitrust amicus briefs, statements of interest, and letter briefs
filed by the DOJ in outside cases136 averaged only 4.6 filings per year from
2000 until Delrahim took office in late 2017, as compared with 15.5 outside

130. Gesmer, supra note 125.
131. Chris Sagers, The Utter Failure of the Trump Administration’s Antitrust Chief,
SLATE: MONEYBOX ( Aug. 10, 2020, 5:50 AM ), https://slate.com/business/2020/08/antitrust-dojdelrahim-trump.html [ https://perma.cc/EZ2B-HNP4 ].
132. Florian Mueller, On DOJ’s Behalf, Former Qualcomm Lawyers File Amicus Brief in Support
of Qualcomm and Point to Paper Co-Authored by Qualcomm Lobbyist: Ninth Circuit Appeal of Consumer
Class Certification, FOSS PATENTS ( June 12, 2019, 3:09 PM ), http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/06/
on-dojs-behalf-former-qualcomm-lawyers.html [ https://perma.cc/V4QE-UDLE].
133. Bryan Koenig & Matthew Perlman, DOJ Antitrust Division Gets Off the Sidelines, LAW360
( Feb. 8, 2019, 8:04 PM ), https://www.law360.com/articles/1126818/doj-antitrust-division-gets-offthe-sidelines [ https://perma.cc/XRT7-NCAC].
134. See Lauren Feiner, Trump’s Outgoing Antitrust Enforcer Delrahim Explains the Government’s
Push Against Big Tech, CNBC ( Jan. 21, 2021, 10:30 AM ), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/21/
trumps-outgoing-antitrust-enforcer-delrahim-explains-the-governments-push-against-b.html [ https://
perma.cc/9S7V-EJTJ ] ( “Delrahim rejects notions even from his own party that certain issues with the
tech platforms can be dealt with through antitrust enforcement.” ).
135. Antitrust Case Filings, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-casefilings [ https://perma.cc/8MRJ-ZNCC ] (last visited Mar. 31, 2022 ). If the partial year of 2017 is
simply omitted, these numbers change to 67.6 and 44.7, respectively. Id.
136. Excluded from the calculation of outside case filings are those cases in which the U.S. was
a party or in which the DOJ was filing briefs on behalf of another U.S. department, because those are
not truly “outside” cases.
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filings per year from the time he took office until the end of 2020.137 Also notable
is that quite a few of the pre-Delrahim filings were not unilaterally initiated
by the DOJ but were submitted in response to court requests for the DOJ’s
opinion.138 This is further evidence of the dramatic shift in priorities that occurred
during Delrahim’s tenure.139
Moreover, the DOJ historically only issued business review letters (BRLs)
upon request from a business or group of businesses.140 However, in September of
2020, the DOJ took the liberty of updating a 2015 BRL in order to change its
position from one that approved of the IEEE’s SEP policy and contemplation of
patent holdup as a competitive problem to one that promoted broader injunctive
rights for SEP holders and condemned the use of antitrust laws to remedy patent
holdup.141 Updating the IEEE’s BRL was a self-described “extraordinary step” and
was the only time since at least 1991 that the DOJ has done this.142 Tellingly, once
Delrahim’s tenure was over, the DOJ promptly removed the updated letter from
the section of its website where other BRLs can be accessed.143 Although the DOJ

137. Appellate Briefs, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/appellate-briefs [ https://
perma.cc/23DJ-737R ] ( last visited Mar. 31, 2022 ). If the partial year of 2017 is simply omitted, these
numbers change to 4.9 and 18, respectively. Id.
138. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div., Opinion Letter regarding Pandora Media,
Inc. v. American Societ’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers ( Mar. 6, 2015 ), https://www.
justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/628831/download [ https://perma.cc/N525-UXFS ]; Brief for
the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund
v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 ( 2d Cir. 2010 ) ( No. 05-2851-cv( L ), 05-2852-cv( CON ) ), https://
www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/491886/download [ https://perma.cc/RU76-BQVY ];
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div., Response of the United States to the Court’s Request for Views on
the Issue of Implied Antitrust Immunity, Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston ( May 5, 2005 ), https://
www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/489336/download [ https://perma.cc/M657-J78V ].
139. Even counting the pre-Delrahim filings that were merely responses to court requests, the
ratio between DOJ viewpoints filed in outside cases and DOJ enforcement actions increased five times
over during Delrahim’s term. That is, the pre-Delrahim DOJ averaged 4.6 outside filings as compared
to 65.7 enforcement actions, which equals approximately a seven percent ratio. Conversely, the
Delrahim DOJ averaged 15.5 outside filings as compared to 43.5 enforcement actions, which equals
approximately a thirty-six percent ratio.
140. Business Review Letters and Request Letters, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/
atr/business-review-letters-and-request-letters [ https://perma.cc/L3CG-BMKC ] ( last visited Mar. 31, 2022 ).
141. Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Sophia
A. Muirhead, Gen. Couns. & Chief Compliance Officer, Inst. of Elec. Eng’rs, Inc.’’ ( Sept. 10, 2020 )
[ hereinafter Updated IEEE Business Review Letter], https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1315291/
download [ https://perma.cc/S945-X92K ].
142. Id.; Business Review Letters and Request Letters, supra note 139.
143. See Allen Grunes, Of Antitrust and Patents: The Quiet Return of the Status Quo at the DOJ’s
Antitrust Division, PROMARKET ( Apr. 26, 2021 ), https://promarket.org/2021/04/26/antitrustpatents-status-quo-doj-makan-delrahim/ [ https://perma.cc/S264-P7XC] ( “[ T ]he DOJ demoted—some
might say ‘buried’—a Business Review Letter containing Delrahim’s views on ‘standard-essential patents.’” ).
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characterized the move as merely procedural, others viewed it as restoring the 2015
BRL and backing away from the Delrahim-era agenda.144
Oddly, Delrahim once stated that his objective was to “remove our thumbs
from the scale.”145 But the amicus briefs, statements of interest, and strong support
for Qualcomm showed that taking thumbs off the scale was not the intent;
these instead demonstrated a firm resolve to sway the law in the monopolists’ favor.
This is exactly the type of political influence antitrust laws seek to avoid, and thus
the antitrust goal of promoting a balance of sociopolitical power amongst
businesses is implicated.
3. Antitrust Enforcement as a Tool for Racial Equity
Whereas there is some debate as to whether the traditional roles of antitrust
law have ever been truly value neutral, the more modern approach is clearly not.146
The modern approach says antitrust enforcement can combat racial inequity by
“dusting off” some existing tools.147 FTC Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter
expressed the idea as follows:
Antitrust enforcement necessarily addresses fundamental economic and
market structures. In the United States, these economic and market
structures are historically and presently inequitable. So, when we make
decisions about whether and where to enforce the law or how to deploy
our enforcement resources, we are making decisions that will have an effect
on structural equity or inequity. Our decisions can either reinforce existing
structural inequities or work to break them down. I would prefer we
choose the latter, and either way, that we make our choice on an informed
basis and with open eyes.148
This approach does have its critics, who argue that antitrust laws are not
well suited for the task.149 However, proponents argue that antitrust law can be
144. See id. ( “Moving a document from one place to another on a government website hardly
seems like a significant change in direction. But in this case, it has been understood as a return to
Obama-era policy.” ).
145. See Gene Quinn, Antitrust and Patents: A Conversation with Makan Delrahim,
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 26, 2020 ), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/03/26/antitrust-patentsconversation-makan-delrahim/id=120166/ [ https://perma.cc/9BHY-7F3Z ] ( quoting a statement
made by Delrahim and discussing the purpose of the 2019 Joint Policy Statement ).
146. See Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust at a Precipice,
Prepared Remarks at GCR Interactive: Women in Antitrust 4 (Nov. 17, 2020 ), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_statements/1583714/slaughter_remarks_at_gcr_interactive_women_in_
antitrust.pdf [ https://perma.cc/5VJN-ZW3X] (“The second problem I have with the premise that
antitrust should be uniquely value-neutral is that I do not believe antitrust can be value-neutral.” ).
147. Dani Kritter, Blog, Antitrust as Antiracist, CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE ( Mar. 2021 ), https://
www.californialawreview.org/antitrust-as-antiracist [ https://perma.cc/BQL8-6LUJ ].
148. Slaughter, supra note 145, at 4.
149. Morales, supra note 2 ( “Some critics argued that the FTC’s jurisdiction cannot be invoked
unless ‘the challenged conduct harms competition and the competitive process’ and that it would not
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anti-racist and that such an agenda is completely in line with the historical
underpinnings of antitrust jurisprudence.150 Specifically, there is a nexus between
rising corporate power, which deepens socioeconomic divisions, and its tendency
to “affect communities of color disproportionately and exacerbate systemic racism.”151
Moreover, the impact of racial inequity is clear in the technology context: per
a recent Silicon Valley Bank study, “Black entrepreneurs received only 1% of the
$130 billion spent in 2019 by venture capitalists in the U.S. — effectively stunting
the ability of communities of color to build wealth and exacerbating racial
inequality.”152 Although the Silicon Valley Bank study does not address FRAND
commitments or patent holdup specifically, it does relate to discrimination in tech
dealmaking generally.153 This is certainly relevant to the “nondiscriminatory”
element of “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.” Thus, in addition to directly
implicating the two historical goals of antitrust law stated above, inequalities in the
technology sphere may implicate antitrust scrutiny under the racial-equality
approach as well.
4. Patent Holdup Harms Competition, Not Just Competitors
Notwithstanding these clear implications, some critics counter that patent
holdup is not actually anticompetitive (i.e., not subject to antitrust scrutiny at all)
because for conduct to be deemed anticompetitive, it must harm competition, not
just competitors.154 While this is a correct statement of the rule, it is incorrect to
suggest that patent holdup merely harms competitors.155 This would ignore the fact
that an SEP holder’s “role as a gatekeeper gives it the power to eliminate, and thus
to harm, competition.”156 Moreover, when implementers must pay significantly
higher royalties for an SEP than they would pay for a comparable piece of
technology (i.e., before the comparable technology was left out of the standard),
downstream markets are affected. Firstly, consumers will have fewer products to
choose from if some implementers are pushed out of the market by way of
injunction or high licensing fees, or if those implementers choose to postpone entry

suffice for the FTC to articulate a ‘goal of making markets fairer or less discriminatory.’ Others claim
that antitrust enforcers are not equipped to achieve anti-racist objectives, and that other programs and
statutes are specifically designed to address discrimination.” ).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Reed Albergotti, Black Start-Up Founders Say Venture Capitalists Are Racist, but the
Law Protects Them, WASH. POST ( July 22, 2020 ), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2020/07/22/black-entrepreneurs-venture-capital/ [ https://perma.cc/2VRW-NMVS ].
154. Statement of Interest, supra note 1, at 9–10.
155. Rsch. in Motion Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 795–96 (N.D. Tex. 2008 )
( reasoning that because “FRAND commitments are intended as a ‘bulwark’ against the unlawful
accumulation of monopoly power that antitrust laws are designed to prevent,” the defendant’s “efforts
to side-step this bulwark” were harmful not only to its competitor “but to competition in general” ).
156. Id. at 796.
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into the market for fear of the same.157 Secondly, consumers will face higher prices
for standard-compliant products because those high licensing fees will be passed
onto them.158 Thirdly, SSOs may adopt a less-than-ideal standard in order to avoid
or mitigate holdup.159 Fourthly, holdup even harms other SEP holders when they
cannot recover royalties on their own patents because other parties have already
“extracted hold-up value from the market.”160 Bars to entry, fewer choices, higher
prices, inferior products, and uneven distribution of royalties are all indicative of
harm to competition, not just to competitors.
For the foregoing reasons, patent holdup implicates antitrust scrutiny. The
next Section explores why antitrust enforcement is not only implicated but
also necessary.
III. IMPORTANCE
A. Antitrust Law Should Continue to Be the Deterrent Against Patent Holdup
Antitrust laws are needed to remedy the anticompetitive harm caused by
patent holdup because they provide successful plaintiffs with treble damages as well
as costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.161 In particular, Section 2 of the Sherman
Act combats illegal monopolies.162 Supreme Court cases have suggested that
antitrust remedies are meant not only to compensate victims but also to deter
violators.163 Without the threat of Section 2 claims against SEP holders, there would
157. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 121, at 36 n.17’’ (“For
consumer harm to occur, it is not necessary that hold up result in higher marginal costs for producers.
For example, higher lump sum or fixed royalties might discourage entry among firms that would
produce the standardized product. The reduction in competition at the downstream level, and possible
reduction in product adoption, might harm consumers.” ).
158. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10–1823, 2013 WL 2111217, at *10
( W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013 ) ( “In addition to harming firms that are forced to pay higher royalties,
hold-up also harms consumers to the extent that those excess costs are passed onto them.” ); Leslie,
supra note 28, at 388 (“Patent holdup inflicts multiple harms across the economy. Patent holdup injures
consumers who ultimately pay higher prices when exorbitant royalties are passed on to them. Economic
efficiency suffers as output is reduced.” ).
159. Leslie, supra note 28, at 389 ( “[ I ]f FRAND commitments are neither credible
nor enforceable, SSOs may adopt suboptimal standards in an effort to minimize the risk of
patent holdup.” ).
160. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *8
( N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013 ); see also Microsoft Corp., 2013 WL 2111217, at *10–11 (No. 11 C 9308 ) (“Hold-up
by one SEP holder also harms other firms that hold SEPs relating to the same standard because it
jeopardizes further adoption of the standard and limits the ability of those other holders to obtain
appropriate royalties on their technology.” ).
161. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 109, at 177–79.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . . ” ).
163. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 ( 1977 ) ( “But § 4 has another purpose in
addition to deterring violators and depriving them of ‘the fruits of their illegality’; it is also designed
to compensate victims of antitrust violations for their injuries.” ( first quoting Hanover Shoe,
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be more incentives for patent holders to conceal their intention to breach FRAND
commitments. Incentives include reaping unrestrained royalties and engaging in
discriminatory licensing until and unless an appropriate FRAND rate is adjudicated
by a court. But many implementers, especially new entrants, may lack the resources
to go to court and obtain such an adjudication.164
Without an effective deterrent in place, there will be more deception, and once
there is more deception, the SSOs will be leery of adopting patented technology
for their standards. Once the SSOs are leery of adopting patented technology
for their standards, they may opt instead for standards that call for non-patented
technology—perhaps something similar but not as ideal as its patented counterpart.165
For example, the patent policy of one SSO, the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI), is that “[i]f a patent owner refuses to commit to license
on FRAND terms and conditions, ETSI will attempt to design around the patent,
and if that is impossible, then work will cease.”166 Logically, the same would be true
if an SSO knows it cannot trust the patent owner’s FRAND commitment. That is,
from the SSO’s point of view, knowing patent holders can and will lie about
FRAND commitments would be equally as bad as allowing them to refuse the
commitments in the first place.
Opting for less-than-ideal technology, designing around a patent, or ceasing
work on a standard could ultimately result in less participation in SSOs and more
“standards wars.” Standards wars happen when differing technologies compete
for consumer choice in the downstream market rather than at the ex ante
standard-selection level.167 Standards wars, discussed more fully in Part III, are
always an option for patent holders but are not ideal for the consuming public.168

Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 ( 1968 ); and then citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 492 U.S. 477, 485–86 ( 1977 ) ) ).
164. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1030 ( 9th Cir. 2015 ) (“[ Standard
setting ] increases competition by lowering barriers to entry . . . . ” ).
165. Leslie, supra note 28, at 389.
166. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. CV
15-2370, 2018 WL 4488286, at *6 ( C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2018 ), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 943 F.3d
1360 ( Fed. Cir. 2019 ).
167. Standards wars are discussed in more detail in Section III.D infra.
168. See Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2001 ), aff’d,
319 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003 ) ( “Without [ industry standards], the industry would balkanize,
improvements would slow, and consumers would suffer.” ); Osenga, supra note 8, at 169–70 ( “[ W ]hen
there are competing standards in the marketplace, some consumers delay purchasing until after the de
facto standard is selected to avoid the costs of choosing the losing standard, either having to use a
suboptimal product or needing to buy a second product to enjoy the benefits that come with
standardization.” ); Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 273 ( 5th Cir. 2008 )
( “Potential procompetitive benefits of standards promoting technological compatibility include
facilitating economies of scale in the market for complementary goods, reducing consumer search costs,
and increasing economic efficiency.” ).
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B. Contract Law Alone Is Insufficient to Deter or Remedy Patent Holdup
It has been argued that FRAND agreements are matters of contract, not
matters of antitrust.169 But contract law is insufficient to cover the wrongdoing of
patent holdup because penalties for breach of contract are not expensive enough to
deter anticompetitive wrongdoing, nor are they enough to make the plaintiff whole
in the SEP-licensing context, and because contract law jurisprudence does not
contemplate long-term, unchanging standards.170 Of these reasons, the deterrent
effect of antitrust law is perhaps the most important. Without the deterrent of
antitrust law, FRAND commitments would be essentially meaningless.
Contract law is insufficient as a deterrent to FRAND violations because
contract damages are limited to single damages.171 This means that if an SEP holder
is held to have breached its contractual FRAND agreement, it will have to pay
back any above-FRAND royalties it has already collected and will only be able to
collect FRAND royalties going forward.172 This puts the SEP holder in no worse a
position than it would have been in if it had complied with its FRAND commitment
in the first place.173 In other words, with antitrust out of the picture there
would be no treble damages, so there would be less of an incentive to avoid
wrongdoing in the SEP-selection process. In fact, negotiating in the shadow of
contract law provides practically no deterrence at all.174 That leaves only reputation,
which one might think would be enough, particularly when SSOs are often
comprised of repeat players.175 But if reputation were enough, patent holdup would
not happen: “Reputation works only if you can avoid dealing with companies that
behave unreasonably; that may not be possible if they own SEPs.”176
169. See generally Delrahim, Broke, supra note 33( “To the extent that implementers bargained
for some benefit, contract law already provides a solution to the problem of patent holders failing to
live up to that bargain. The parties are on equal terms when they bargain in the shadow of contract law,
because there is no threat of treble damages skewing the negotiations in favor of the implementer.” );
Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div., The “New Madison”
Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, Prepared Remarks at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School 5 ( Mar. 16, 2018 ) [ hereinafter Delrahim, New Madison ], https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1044316/download [ https://perma.cc/PH6R-Y5YG ].
170. See Leslie, supra note 28, at 400.
171. Id. at 422 (“Although called compensatory damages, the single damages associated with
contract law do not actually fully compensate victims of breach for their injuries.” ).
172. Id. ( “With respect to remedies, under contract law, if the patentee charges a royalty that is
not FRAND, the contract plaintiff can recover the difference between the FRAND amount and the
royalty actually paid. In contrast, successful antitrust plaintiffs are entitled to treble damages on the
overcharge as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” ).
173. See id. The SEP holder would still have to pay legal fees, but these can be built into the
cost of doing business, especially since those same legal fees make FRAND litigation cost-prohibitive
for the plaintiff-implementers on the other side.
174. See id.
175. See Osenga, supra note 8, at 173 (“[ S ]tandardization is often a repeat-player game; if a
patent holder acts in an unfair manner, it is unlikely that other firms will be willing to urge adoption of
that patent holder’s technology in future standard setting proceedings.” ).
176. Shapiro & Lemley, supra note 106, at 2039.

_SETIRV12.dotm (Do Not Delete)

1112

4/9/2022 4:52 PM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 12:1085

In addition to failing to deter patent holdup, contract damages fail to make a
plaintiff whole. Contract law, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, only provides
successful plaintiffs with the difference between the higher royalties they actually
paid and the lower, FRAND royalties they should have paid. This does not
compensate the plaintiff (i.e., the implementer) for attorney’s fees or costs of
investigating the suit because contract law generally follows what is known as the
American Rule, which is that “win or lose” each side pays its own attorney’s fees.177
Courts generally do not deviate from this rule absent “explicit statutory authority”
or “specific and explicit” contractual provisions.178 This explains why implementers
need costs and attorney’s fees in order to make a lawsuit worth their while.
A final reason contract law is insufficient is because standards are long-term,
whereas contracts are typically for defined periods.179 Once an industry has selected
a standard, the standard becomes entrenched, and switching costs prohibit any
“new competitive process” that would change the technology involved.180 “This
is very different from the situation in which, for example, a year-long contract
is granted every year and a particular firm gets the contract through
misrepresentations; that situation can be remedied moving forward at the next
opportunity for contract renewal.”181
C. Patent Rewards Do Not Have to Be Unrestricted in Order to Encourage Innovation
One of the primary and most seductive arguments against antitrust
enforcement of FRAND commitments is that innovation will be stifled in the
absence of unqualified patent rights.182 Patent rights generally include the right to
exclude any and all others from practicing one’s patent and the ability to maximize
license fees when others are permitted to practice the patent.183 When a patent is an
SEP, these rights are qualified and constrained by FRAND commitments, such that
SEP holders must make their technologies available to all applicants who wish to
comply with the standard and must not charge more than what is fair and

177. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U.S. 121, 126 ( 2015 ).
178. Id. ( first quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health
& Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 ( 2001 ); and then quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 ( 1975 ) ).
179. Leslie, supra note 28, at 400.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Statement of Interest, supra note 1, at 9 ( “[ In lawsuits involving ] deception
regarding contractual commitments and breaches of those commitments . . . [ antitrust ] liability—and
treble damages in particular— . . . would tend to chill dynamic competition and innovation, the exact
goals that the antitrust laws are intended to promote. These claims, therefore, should be dismissed
with prejudice.” ).
183. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 ( “Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” ).
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reasonable.184 Allowing SEP holders to enter into insincere FRAND agreements
with the intent to maintain unqualified patent rights implicates antitrust scrutiny.185
Antitrust law deters the maximizing of license fees in violation of FRAND
commitments and the seeking of injunctions against implementers who are
unwilling to pay above-FRAND royalties.186 Some fear this deterrent effect will
extend to innovation—that is, innovators will stop innovating.187
Fortunately, this fear is unwarranted. Scholars have indicated that no
such huge reward is needed from the patent system in order to encourage
innovation. 188 Not only that, but competition aids in incentivizing
innovation. 189 It is complimentary to exclusion (i.e., to patent rights) in terms
of encouraging innovation.
The following statements are typical of the innovation-will-suffer argument.
First, “[t]he guarantee of market-driven financial rewards for invention serves as a
powerful incentive for the development of new inventions that can render old
technologies obsolete.”190 Second, “[r]ecognizing a Section 2 cause of action
premised on alleged violations of commitments to offer patent licenses at rates that
are FRAND would [ ] run contrary to the policies underlying the antitrust laws that
encourage market-based pricing . . . . ”191 The first of these statements makes sense,
but the second is problematic.
First of all, a FRAND price is the market-based price. A FRAND commitment
is not a set price negotiated by the SSO but rather the flexible standard that must
184. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 986 ( 9th Cir. 2020 )
( declining to conclude whether Qualcomm breached its FRAND commitments, but noting that in
those commitments Qualcomm agreed to make its SEPs available on fair and reasonable terms to all
applicants wishing to implement the relevant standards).
185. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 390–91 (1948 ) ( indicating that courts
must “balance the privileges of [ the patent holder ] and its licensees under the patent grants with the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act against combinations and attempts to monopolize” ).
186. See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 660 (2d Cir. 2015 )
( “[ A] patent does not confer upon the patent holder an ‘absolute and unfettered right to use its
intellectual property as it wishes,’ and ‘[ i ]ntellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate
the antitrust laws.’” ( first quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001 ) ( per
curiam ); then quoting In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 ( Fed. Cir. 2000 ) ) ).
187. See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div., The Long
Run: Maximizing Innovation Incentives Through Advocacy and Enforcement, Prepared Remarks for
LeadershIP Conference 3 ( Apr. 10, 2018 ) [ hereinafter Delrahim, The Long Run ], https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1050956/download [ https://perma.cc/KF3J-P5GJ] (“[ D ]enying
injunctive relief to standard essential patent holders except in the rarest circumstances . . . could have
an unintended and harmful effect on dynamic competition by undermining important incentives to
innovate . . . . ” ); see also Letter from Thom Tillis, supra note 1( expressing that the DOJ’s draft policy
statement “seeks to undermine the patent system,” which must work together with antitrust policies to
“create a balanced, strong, innovation ecosystem” ).
188. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 73 ( 2008 ).
189. See id. at 90.
190. Statement of Interest, supra note 1, at 2.
191. Id.
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be followed by all bilateral negotiations between the patent holder and each
implementer.192 When the implementers and patent holder negotiate the FRAND
price, they are looking at market factors to determine what is fair and reasonable,193
and therefore the FRAND price cannot be contrary to the principles underlying
antitrust law. On the contrary, the FRAND price is exactly in line with the principles
of market-based pricing, and it is patent holdup that runs contrary to those
principles. Absent antitrust enforcement of FRAND commitments, with monopoly
power having been conferred on a patent holder, the patent holder can extract
financial rewards far higher than the market would have dictated had the
implementer not been locked into the standard. In other words, royalties that are
unhinged from FRAND commitments are above-market, monopolistic royalties,
not “market-based pricing” as suggested.194
What’s more is that even if the FRAND price were disconnected from the
market, the availability of above-FRAND rewards could not be the only incentive
to innovate because patent holders regularly agree to license their innovations on
FRAND terms.195 This is the huge-reward vs. reasonable-reward argument again.
An unqualified reward is obviously not necessary to encourage involvement in the
standard-setting process.196 Nor is an unqualified reward necessary to spur
innovation.197 As one scholar explained, “as long as there are profits and not
losses,” then a rational business that innovates under a patent system with broad
exclusionary rights will also do so under a qualified patent system with narrower
exclusionary rights.198
The ideal balance is to have rights of ownership and exclusion on the one hand
and lawful competition on the other, with both working together to drive
innovation.199 A patent provides rights of ownership and exclusion—namely, the
192. See Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting
Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 855, 859 ( 2011 ) ( “[ N ]o SSO, court, or enforcement agency has
offered a workable and generally accepted definition of fair and reasonable licensing terms.” ).
193. See id. at 860 (“The competitive royalty is the outcome of bilateral negotiations, and is
related to the value created by the technology relative to its next-best alternative.” ).
194. See Statement of Interest, supra note 1, at 2.
195. See, e.g., IEEE at a Glance, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, https://www.ieee.org/about/at-aglance.html [ https://perma.cc/LZH8-XCW6 ] (Dec. 2021 ) (“IEEE has . . . [ o]ver 400,000 members
in more than 160 countries [ and] an active portfolio of nearly 1,200 standards and more than 900
projects under development . . . . ” ).
196. See Osenga, supra note 8, at 186 ( “Since FRAND contracts are willing agreements between
highly competent parties, ‘it logically follows that such agreements, correctly interpreted, must generate
valuable benefits to innovators and implementers alike.’” ( quoting Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan
B. Noroozi, Why Incentives for “Patent Holdout” Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why It Matters,
32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1386 ( 2017 ) ) ).
197. Liivak, supra note 1, at 1663.
198. Id. ( comparing the current patent system to one more akin to the copyright system, in
which free entry by independent inventors would be allowed as long as there is no actual copying ).
199. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 186(“Perhaps one of the clearest lessons of the
Cold War was that private-property and market economies can be powerful engines of economic
growth and innovation.” ).
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right, for a limited time, to exclude others from practicing one’s invention.200 Patent
owners can enforce this right by seeking reasonable injunctions.201 Hence, a patent
is certainly one of the rewards that incentivizes companies to innovate and to invest
in research and development.202 However, stronger patent rights do not
automatically equate to stronger innovation.203 A patent is considered a big reward
because it grants exclusive rights to use an invention. The orthodox belief is that
granting a patent is an incentive for people to invest in innovation.204 But some
scholars say this is more like a leap of faith than an economic understanding because
there is very little evidence supporting the belief.205 Many technological fields that
are likely to have standards and FRAND issues, such as the telecommunications
industry 206 and the software industry,207 do not require such a big reward
(i.e., unqualified exclusionary rights) in order to incentivize innovation.208 In fact,
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ( “Congress shall have Power . . . [ t ]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” ).
201. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.” ).
202. See id.
203. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 186, at 84 ( “Intellectual property rights are not just like
other property rights, and simple casual observations about the correlation between United States or
Western technology and patent systems can be misleading. On the other hand, this does not mean that
patents have no measurable effects, but rather that it appears that their effects might be more tentative,
being contingent upon the details of the patent system or the particular technology, industry, or state
of economic development.” ).
204. Liivak, supra note 1, at 1659 ( “The general notion is that a system that allowed for
competition from independent inventors would result in a smaller reward to the initial inventor and
risks ‘undermin[ ing ] incentives to develop the invention at all.’” ( quoting Mark A Lemley, Should Patent
Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1525, 1529 ( 2007 ) ) ).
205. Lemley, supra note 111, at 1332, 1335 ( “In the past three decades there has been an
unprecedented—indeed, astonishing—outpouring of sophisticated empirical work on virtually every
aspect of IP law and innovative and creative markets . . . . [ This empirical ] evidence casts substantial
doubt on the efficacy of [ recent IP] laws.” ).
206. Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of
the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 960 (2001 ) (“Some commentators have even
suggested that competition, not monopoly, is actually the best spur to investment by incumbents in
telecommunications and related fields.” ).
207. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 186, at 85 ( “[ A 2004 empirical study ] looked at the effect
of changes in the United States treatment of inventions that involve software. They found that the
number of software patents grew dramatically. Firms in the software industry acquired relatively
few patents, however; instead, most were obtained by firms in electronics and computer industries
known for stockpiling large arsenals of patents to use as bargaining chips. Moreover, the firms that
acquired relatively more software patents tended to actually reduce their level of R&D spending relative
to sales.” ).
208. One notable exception is the pharmaceutical industry, where evidence shows that the high
cost of R&D does in fact need to be incentivized by a big reward at the end. See id. at 13 ( “Case studies
present a convincing argument that patents are critical for investment in R&D in the pharmaceutical
industry. On the other hand, survey evidence suggests that in most other industries, patents do not pose
much of a barrier to imitation, and firms rely mainly on other means, such as lead-time advantages and
trade secrecy, to obtain returns on their R&D investments.” ).
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they may be motivated by the opposite—competition.209 Thus, antitrust scrutiny of
requests for injunctions against willing licensees will not discourage innovation in
these fields.
Lawful competition promoted by the antitrust laws is a better driver of
innovation than unfettered exclusionary rights over an SEP.210 It has been argued
that “possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages
thrift and depresses energy.”211 In contrast, when the standard-selection
process is supported by meaningful FRAND commitments—that is, when patent
holders engage in fair competition on the merits of their technology and
implementers compete for development and sales of interoperable products in the
marketplace—technological progress is stimulated.212
Researchers have found that “innovation is greatest when firms earn modest
rents [profits]; too much or too little competition reduces innovation rates.”213 This
is because new entrants can “spur incumbents not to rest on their laurels” and
“bring diverse knowledge that increases the odds of future innovation success.”214
Competition’s positive effect on innovation has been confirmed by other
researchers following the patterns seen in several new technologies, who found that
“[l]ess innovation occurs when firms face less threat of competition,” even though
patenting rates are highest when there is less competition.215 This “suggests that
much innovation is not dependent on patenting.”216
Additionally, natural economic experiments have shown that while a
strengthening of patent laws in certain countries can increase innovation, a
strengthening of patent laws in countries that already have “high levels of patent
‘strength’ . . . actually decrease[s] innovation.”217 Moreover, a steady stream of
licensing royalties is arguably already a big reward, even if those royalties must
remain fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.

209. Id. ( “Moreover, several studies suggest that a moderate degree of competition might
actually spur innovation.” ).
210. See C. Scott Hemphill, Disruptive Incumbents: Platform Competition in an Age of Machine
Learning, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1982 ( 2019 ) ( citing Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare
and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 619–22 ( Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962 ) (“The
preinvention monopoly power acts as a strong disincentive to further innovation.” ) ).
211. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 ( 2d Cir. 1945 ).
212. See GRIDWISE, FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF INTEROPERABILITY, supra note 120, at 7
( “Interoperability promotes competition, and competition encourages innovation and quality.” ).
213. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 186, at 90.
214. Id. at 89.
215. Id. at 90.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 88. Here, the natural economic experiments involved empirical evidence gathered
from before and after a specific strengthening of a country’s patent laws.
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D. Proprietary Products and Standards Wars
In any event, working through an SSO is a choice.218 It is an attractive choice
because it allows patent owners to “licens[e] their patent rights to implementers
who can more efficiently deliver those technologies to end users.”219 As groups
of competitors working together to select the technology that works best for
them collectively, SSOs provide a host of benefits for most of those involved
and for consumers as well.220 However, collectively set standards are not the
only way to go.
Rather than compete for inclusion in a selected standard, patent owners can
opt to go it alone by creating (or licensing others to create) proprietary end products
that incorporate their patented technology and take their chances on whether those
products will be chosen by consumers in the marketplace. No SSOs and no
implementers need be involved. Patent rights without a FRAND commitment
generally give patent holders the right to enter into exclusive licenses or to refuse to
license their technology to anyone.221 If a patent holder wants to do this without
risking antitrust liability, or to be free to charge unrestricted royalties, it should stay
out of standard setting and gain its monopoly through a superior end product,
which is one of the legal ways to obtain a monopoly.222
This is referred to as a “standards war” because it presents consumers with
choices between incompatible products.223 Standards wars typically result in the
more popular product becoming the de facto standard or in multiple standards
remaining available in the market.224 Famously, the “‘War of the Currents’ between
Thomas Edison, George Westinghouse, and Nikola Tesla . . . paved the way for the
modern world.”225 And although alternating current initially won the day, “direct

218. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 121, at 34 n.6 ( “In a
‘standards war,’ substitute products with incompatible designs are introduced into a market, and users’
purchase decisions ultimately establish one design as the dominant design or de facto standard, in what
can effectively be a winner-take-all competition.” ).
219. Statement of Interest, supra note 1, at 2.
220. See supra Parts I and II.
221. See 35 U.S.C. § 271.
222. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966 ) ( “The offense
of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: ( 1 ) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and ( 2 ) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident.” ).
223. See Osenga, supra note 8, at 169 (“The ‘standards war,’ or competition between firms
seeking to become the standardized technology by winning market selection, further requires firms to
expend significant resources in trying to attract the larger market share.” ).
224. Id.
225. Jeffrey Wilder, Econ. Dir. of Enforcement, Antitrust Div, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Leveling the
Playing Field in the Standards Ecosystem: Principles for A Balanced Antitrust Enforcement Approach
to Standards-Essential Patents, Prepared Remarks at IAM & Global Competition Review Summit on
Standards Essential Patents ( Sept. 29, 2021 ), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/antitrust-divisioneconomics-director-enforcement-jeffrey-wilder-iam-and-gcr-connect-sep [ https://perma.cc/E6B5-PDYP ].
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current has seen a bit of a renaissance” with direct current being used in electric
vehicles, in computers, and as a means to “transport electricity long distances with
less electricity loss.”226 Other well-known examples were the rivalries between VHS
and Betamax, setting VHS as the de facto standard, and between Blu-ray Disc and
HD DVD, setting Blu-ray as the de facto standard.227 On the other hand, Nintendo,
Xbox, and PlayStation consoles have all remained available to consumers despite
that they are competing, incompatible standards.228
Although a standards war can incur significant expense and risk to the patent
holder, once the war is won, the winning patent holder will have achieved a
legal, unqualified monopoly.229 The victor in a standards war has no FRAND
commitment and can refuse to license its patent to anyone, thus preventing others
from making compatible, competing products.230 Or, this legal monopolist can
grant licenses at high, monopoly prices if it so chooses. The only ways to dethrone
the holder of a de facto standard are to wait until the patent expires (or, in the case
of some software copyrights, to wait until the copyright expires, which is a much
longer time period) or to develop such a superior technology that users are willing
to make the switch and incur the associated switching costs.231
Some commentators contend that becoming part of a collectively set standard
does not add value to a patent because that patent was already valuable, which is
why it was selected for the standard.232 But this argument ignores the fact that the
SEP holder made a business decision to be part of that standard. They believed that
their patent would be more valuable as an SEP than as a proprietary component, or
226. Allison Lantero, The War of the Currents: AC vs. DC Power, U.S. D EP ’ T ENERGY
( Nov. 18, 2014 ), https://www.energy.gov/articles/war-currents-ac-vs-dc-power [ https://perma.cc/
8AGV-MPDK] ( “So it appears the War of the Currents may not be over yet. But instead of continuing
in a heated AC vs. DC battle, it looks like the two currents will end up working parallel to each other
in a sort of hybrid armistice.” ).
227. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 121, at 34 n.6. Some scholars
contend the Blu-ray vs. HD battle was not a classic standards war because it “was not fought with
technological superiority but instead with exclusivity contracts,” but for purposes of this Note, it is
included as a recognizable example. See Kevin L. Spark, Note, Format War, Antitrust Casualties: The
Sherman Act and the Blu-Ray–HD DVD Format War, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 173, 173 (2009 ).
228. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 121, at 34 n.6.
229. See id. at 34 n.8 (“To win a standards war, a firm may have to incur significant costs or
limit its assertion of market power in order to establish an installed base of users. The winner of a
standards war, however, may have significant market power, often because it can enforce its patent
rights to prevent others from making products that conform to the standard.” ).
230. See id.
231. See Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust/Intellectual Property Interface: An Emerging Solution to
an Intractable Problem, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 363, 392 (2002 ) ( “Microsoft Windows is now the de facto
industry standard: it is the platform to which most software is written. But a sufficiently superior
technology could displace Windows. The challenge is that the newer technology would have to be
enough of an improvement over Windows to overcome the switching costs that users would incur in
adopting it.” ).
232. Gene Quinn, Standard Essential Patents: The Myths and Realities of Standard
Implementation, IPWATCHDOG ( Feb. 4, 2019 ), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/02/04/standardessential-patents-myth-realities-standard-implementation/id=105940/ [ https://perma.cc/6ZJ7-V5DJ ].
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at least that participating in a collectively set standard would be better than gambling
on the market-selection process of a standards war.
Patent holders are not victims in a world in which deception on an SSO is
considered anticompetitive behavior—patent holders have other options, and any
decision to participate in the standard-setting process would necessarily be based
on a risk-benefit analysis. This is not to suggest that it would be desirable to see
more standards wars in lieu of standard-setting processes. Although competition to
win a standards war can certainly drive innovation,233 standard selection by an SSO
is more efficient and less risky than standard selection by the market.234 As stated
previously, decreased participation in standards would cause technological
improvements to slow,235 prices and consumer search costs to increase,236 and some
consumers to hold off on making new purchases until the market settled on one de
facto standard or another.237 The current Joint Policy Statement by the DOJ,
USPTO, and NIST acknowledges the benefits of standards set by SSOs:
Standards, particularly voluntary consensus standards set by [SSOs], play
a vital role in the economy. [SSOs] develop standards using open,
transparent, and consensus-based processes to address issues of interest to
their stakeholders. By allowing products designed and manufactured by
many different firms to function together, interoperability standards can
create enormous value for consumers and fuel the creation and utilization
of new and innovative technologies to benefit consumers.238
Despite the high potential reward for obtaining a legal monopoly through a de
facto standard, many patent holders of innovative technology understandably try to
obtain a monopoly through selection by an SSO.239

233. Wilder, supra note 223.
234. See id. (“When [ the SSO ] ecosystem works well, competition in standardized products
thrives and consumers benefit. When it does not, we can miss out on standards that might make us
safer, healthier, or more connected.” ).
235. Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1040 ( N.D. Cal. 2001 ) aff’d, 319
F.3d 1357 ( Fed. Cir. 2003 ).
236. Golden Bridge Tech. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 2008 ).
237. Jeffrey R. Church & Roger Ware, Network Industries, Intellectual Property Rights and
Competition Policy, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 230–39 ( Robert D. Anderson & Nancy T. Gallini eds., 1998 )
( “During a standards war, however, some consumers may delay purchasing until the de facto standard
is chosen because they do not want to be stuck with the costs of moving from a losing standard to the
winning standard.” ).
238. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. & NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND
TECH., POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO
VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 2 ( 2019 ) [ hereinafter JOINT POLICY STATEMENT ], https://
www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1228016/download [ https://perma.cc/TLV3-LE35 ].
239. As discussed, whether or not this is a legal monopoly depends on whether there was
deception regarding the patent holder’s intent to honor its FRAND commitments.
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IV. DISTRACTION
This Part IV submits that, although an SEP holder’s ability to seek a
permanent injunction against an implementer is highly relevant to the issue of patent
holdup, the debate over the availability of such an injunction is distracting and
misleading.
Before explaining the tension surrounding injunctions, this Note seeks to
emphasize two main points. First, there is no categorical rule that injunctions are
unavailable when the patent at issue is an SEP.240 Second, courts are perfectly
capable of analyzing SEP injunctions under the general equitable framework.241 The
focus should instead remain on keeping antitrust lawsuits available to implementers,
even if the threat of such lawsuits might deter SEP holders from seeking injunctions.
A. The Controversy over Injunctions
Typical remedies available to patent holders when someone uses their patented
inventions without a license are injunctions and damages, which can include treble
damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees.242 The most controversial of these—when the
patent at issue is an SEP—is the injunction.243 Although treble damages, costs, and
attorneys’ fees have also been criticized as inappropriate in the SEP context,244 they
have not garnered nearly as much attention.
240. Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1331 ( Fed. Cir. 2014 ), overruled on other
grounds by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 ( Fed. Cir. 2015 ) ( “To the extent that the
district court applied a per se rule that injunctions are unavailable for SEPs, it erred.” ); see also INST. OF
ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, IEEE-SA BOARD BYLAWS 17–21 (2022 ) [ hereinafter IEEE PATENT
POLICY ], https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-standards/standards/web/documents/other/
sb_bylaws.pdf [ https://perma.cc/79EE-KE35 ].
241. Apple, 757 F.3d at 1332 ( “[ T ]he district courts are more than capable of considering these
factual issues when deciding whether to issue an injunction under the principles in eBay.” ). It has been
suggested that the DOJ’s revised policy stance leaves too much discretion to the courts alone, but it is
unclear why giving nonbinding policy guidance and leaving courts to follow court precedent would be
considered improper. See Letter from Thom Tillis, supra note 1(“I am very concerned with what appears
to be the DOJ’s attempt to diminish patent holders’ statutory rights and undermine the judicial process
by substituting the courts’ judgment for its own.” ).
242. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–284 ( “[ C]ourts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable . . . . Upon finding for the claimant the court shall
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs
as fixed by the court . . . . [ T ]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found
or assessed.” ).
243. Osenga, supra note 8, at 174–75 ( “Because injunctive relief is often unavailable to SEP
owners as part of court and commentator efforts to ‘fix’ patent hold-up, the patent owner has little
recourse other than to sue the refusing implementer for payment of a reasonable royalty . . . the same
thing it was seeking in the first instance.” ).
244. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1925 (2002 ) ( contending that FRAND obligations should bar patent infringement
actions, whether seeking injunctions or damages, because patent infringement claims “might result in
an injunction, treble damages, and attorneys’ fees” ); Doug Lichtman, Understanding the Rand
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For context, the following concepts explain why injunctions are such an issue
for SEP holders and implementers alike. For SEP holders, injunctions are arguably
more effective than money damages at deterring patent infringement.245 Relevant
to both sides is that the threat of an injunction provides SEP holders with
negotiating leverage over the implementers.246 And the implementers cannot market
standard-compliant products without access to the SEP. Therefore, if a permanent
injunction is allowed against an implementer, that is an absolute barrier to entry into
the market.247
Commentaries on these opposing positions often use extreme language to
describe when injunctions should be granted, though both sides are fundamentally
saying the same thing—injunctions should be granted when an implementer refuses
to pay a reasonable royalty or unreasonably delays in negotiating the same, but not
otherwise.248 For example, one scholarly article argued that when courts favor
damages remedies over injunctions, they incentivize implementers to avoid paying
royalties, and that courts should “automatically issue an injunction” if an
implementer is found to have used a patented invention that it “did not attempt to
license in good faith.”249 In other words, despite the pro-injunction tone of the
argument, it is saying that granting an injunction should be conditional on a finding
of bad faith. Another example is that Judge Sharon Prost’s concurring opinion in
Apple v. Motorola has been portrayed as taking the view that “an implementer’s
negotiation conduct—no matter how intransigent—should never justify granting an
injunction to the holder of the SEP.”250 But her actual words explicitly agreed with
the majority “that there is no need to create a categorical rule that a patentee can
never obtain an injunction on a FRAND-committed patent.”251 Her only deviation
Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1043 ( 2010 ) ( “Courts could interpret RAND as a public
commitment that creates a defense of equitable estoppel. Under that estoppel, the patent holder
would be deemed to have permanently waived his right to seek triple damages or to ask for injunctive
relief, but would otherwise be allowed to invoke patent law’s damages regime.” ). But cf. Suzanne
Michel, Bargaining for RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889,
893 ( 2011 ) ( “If negotiations break down, the implementer can bring a contract claim asking the
court to enforce the patentee’s promise to license at RAND rates. The patentee can claim patent
infringement, seeking remedies, including compensatory damages and a permanent injunction
prohibiting future infringement.” ).
245. See Osenga, supra note 8, at 174–75 ( arguing that without injunctive relief, the “rational
strategy of all implementers” would be to refuse to pay royalties until a court orders them to do so ).
246. See J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for
Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley & Shapiro, 82 MINN. L. REV. 714, 714 ( 2008 ).
247. Saransh Chaturvedi & Ditipriya Dutta Chowdhary, The Effect of Injunctive Relief on
Antitrust: The United States Position, IPLEADERS ( June 10, 2020 ), https://blog.ipleaders.in/the-effectof-injunctive-relief-on-antitrust-the-united-states-position/ [ https://perma.cc/8EU9-XMD4 ].
248. Apple Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1332 ( Fed. Cir. 2014 ), overruled on other grounds
by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 ( Fed. Cir. 2015 ).
249. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B. Noroozi, Why Incentives for “Patent Holdout”
Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why It Matters, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1382 ( 2017 ).
250. Id. at 1415 ( emphasis added ).
251. Apple, 757 F.3d at 1342 ( Prost, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part ).
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from the majority opinion was to add that an injunction is truly only necessary if
the “alleged infringer were judgment-proof” or where sanctions were in order for
failure to pay court-ordered damages.252 She also added that an implementer is “fully
entitled to challenge the validity of a FRAND-committed patent before agreeing to
pay a license on that patent, and so should not necessarily be punished for less than
eager negotiations.”253
There is also plenty of misleading commentary implying that injunctions are
barred by antitrust enforcement of FRAND commitments.254 For example, it has
been commented that
If a patent holder effectively loses its right to an injunction whenever a
licensing dispute arises, or is deterred from seeking an injunction due to
the prospect of treble damages, an implementer can freely infringe,
knowing that the most he or she will eventually have to pay is a reasonable
royalty rate.255
Similar comments posit that “[r]emoving the injunction option . . . not only
changes the bargaining range (and makes infringement a valid business option), but,
by extension, it lowers the expected returns of investing in the creation and
commercialization of patents, in the first place.”256 It has even been implied that
policies of SSOs, like those of the IEEE, currently preclude SEP holders with
FRAND commitments from seeking injunctions.257 When framed in this way, it is
tempting to find cause for concern.
As for SSO policies like those of the IEEE, one’s first reaction might be
that, of course, they should not prohibit patent owners from being able to exclude
non-royalty-paying implementers from practicing their patents. But, interestingly,
the IEEE’s Patent Policy does not prohibit injunctions.258 It merely prohibits
injunctions against implementers who are willing to comply with FRAND rates
once those rates have been determined by a court.259 The purpose of this policy is
252. Id. at 1343.
253. Id. at 1342.
254. See, e.g., Delrahim, The Long Run, supra note 185, at 2–3 ( “[ B ]y denying injunctive relief
to standard essential patent holders except in the rarest circumstances, courts in the U.S. run the risk
of turning a FRAND commitment into a compulsory license. As a defender of competitive markets, I
am concerned that these patent law developments could have an unintended and harmful effect on
dynamic competition by undermining important incentives to innovate, and ultimately, have a
detrimental effect on U.S. consumers.” ).
255. Delrahim, New Madison, supra note 167, at 14.
256. Auer et al., supra note 123, at 163 (emphasis added ).
257. See Updated IEEE Business Review Letter, supra note 140.
258. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1190 ( W.D. Wash. 2013)
( “There is no provision in Motorola’s contracts with the IEEE and ITU expressly stating that Motorola
is prohibited from seeking injunctive relief against SEP implementers. Neither party argues that such a
provision exists.” ).
259. IEEE PATENT POLICY, supra note 236, 20 (“The Submitter of an Accepted [ Letter of
Assurance ] who has committed to make available a license for one or more Essential Patent Claims
agrees that it shall neither seek nor seek to enforce a Prohibitive Order based on such Essential Patent
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likely to keep the threat of an injunction away from the negotiating table,
where it could otherwise be wielded by the SEP holder to “dramatically influence”
royalty rates above what is fair and reasonable.260 It seems that what the critics of
these policies really want is for injunctive relief to be available to patent holders
even when they ask for supra-FRAND royalties.261 Indeed, they may have made
some headway as different courts have “reached differing results” regarding the
circumstances under which a FRAND-committed SEP holder can obtain an
injunction against an implementer.262 But SSO policies, like those of the IEEE,
should be supported by courts and enforcement agencies because it is the SSOs
who are uniquely situated to understand and protect against the anticompetitive
issues that arise in FRAND licensing.263
As for antitrust enforcement, it is not clear why critics claim it would remove
the injunction option. It does make sense, however, that an SEP holder would be
deterred from seeking an injunction, for fear of either a retaliatory antitrust lawsuit
initiated by an implementer or an antitrust enforcement action initiated by the

Claim( s ) in a jurisdiction unless the implementer fails to participate in, or to comply with the outcome of, an
adjudication, including an affirming first-level appellate review, if sought by any party within
applicable deadlines, in that jurisdiction by one or more courts that have the authority to: determine
Reasonable Rates and other reasonable terms and conditions; adjudicate patent validity, enforceability,
essentiality, and infringement; award monetary damages; and resolve any defenses and counterclaims.”
( emphasis added )).
260. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 96, at 1993.
261. See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div., “Telegraph
Road”: Incentivizing Innovation at the Intersection of Patent and Antitrust Law, Prepared Remarks at
the Nineteenth Annual Berkeley-Stanford Advanced Patent Law Institute 4 (Dec. 7, 2018 ), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1117686/download [ https://perma.cc/9XHH-S8XW ].
262. Microsoft, 963 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (“Compare Realtek Semiconductor ( holding that it was
a breach of the RAND commitment to seek injunctive relief before even offering a license ) and Apple,
Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. ( finding injunctive relief unavailable unless the implementer has refused to pay a
RAND royalty ) with Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc. ( holding that the RAND commitment did
not deprive defendant of its right to seek injunctive relief ).” ( first citing Realtek Semiconductor
Corp. v. LSI Corp., 946 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1006–07 ( N.D. Cal. 2013 ); then citing Apple, Inc. v. Motorola,
Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 912–13 (N.D. Ill. 2012 ); and then citing Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility,
Inc., No. 11-cv-178, 2012 WL 5416941 ( W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 2012 ) ) ). There also appears to be a recent
trend toward courts holding against antitrust plaintiffs in patent holdup cases. This is why policies like
the IEEE’s are wise to require an adjudication of the FRAND rate before allowing an SEP holder to
seek an injunction. Because courts have had mixed holdings on antitrust enforcement of patent holdup,
and because SSO policies can aid in the prevention of patent holdup, they provide a layer of protection
beyond reliance on the courts. Regarding such recent trend in the courts, see Federal Trade Commission
v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974, 997 (9th Cir. 2020 ) ( giving nod to the antitrust rationale that
“intentional deception” of an SSO gives rise to antitrust liability, but nevertheless “declin[ ing ] to hold
that Qualcomm’s alleged breach of its SSO commitments to license its SEPs on FRAND
terms . . . amounted to anticompetitive conduct in violation of § 2” where there was no finding of
intentional deception ), and Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. v. Avanci, LLC, 485 F. Supp. 3d
712, 734 (N.D. Tex. 2020 ) ( “An SEP holder may choose to contractually limit its right to license
the SEP through a FRAND obligation, but a violation of this contractual obligation is not an
antitrust violation.” ).
263. Wilder, supra note 223.
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government.264 Understandably, it has been argued that the ambiguity in the market
about what constitutes a fair and reasonable royalty rate leaves patent owners to
“guess” about when they can safely seek an injunction.265 But that is exactly the
point of antitrust scrutiny. Antitrust law should be at play to deter firms from
engaging in patent holdup and to force them to question their own actions before
seeking injunctions against implementers who are willing to pay reasonable royalties.
B. The General Legal Framework Regarding Injunctions Is Sufficient
Not every area of tension requires a special law. The pro-injunction side is
correct that an injunction analysis in the SEP context should be consistent with
traditional patent dispute principles. However, the pro-injunction side goes too far
when it suggests that antitrust law should not be involved.
The current Joint Policy Statement by the DOJ, USPTO, and NIST, for
example, is undergoing revision for that very reason.266 Its purported aim was to
dismiss any misinterpretation of the 2013 Statement as having encouraged a per
se rule limiting injunctive rights for SEPs.267 This in itself was an innocuous
stance—clarifying that there is no per se rule for exclusionary relief for SEPs is in
keeping with the American tradition of avoiding rule-based formalism in this area.268
But, as is often the case, the real crux of the policy change was buried in a footnote
rejecting the applicability of antitrust law in FRAND disputes.269
In other words, the current Joint Policy Statement got it partially right in
stressing that injunctions and other exclusionary remedies should be available to

264. Part I of this Note discusses that deception constitutes monopoly conduct, which is one
of the required elements of a prima facie Section 2 claim under United States v. Grinnell Corporation,
384 U.S. 563 ( 1966 ).
265. Auer et al., supra note 123, at 164.
266. See JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 236, at 4, 4 n.9.
267. Id. at 4 ( “[ T]he USPTO, NIST, and the DOJ . . . have developed additional experience
with disputes concerning standards-essential patents . . . . [ T]he agencies have heard concerns that the
2013 policy statement has been misinterpreted to suggest that a unique set of legal rules should be
applied in disputes concerning patents subject to a F/RAND commitment that are essential to
standards ( as distinct from patents that are not essential ), and that injunctions and other exclusionary
remedies should not be available in actions for infringement of standards-essential patents.” ).
268. See Muris, supra note 7( “[ E ]ffort[ s ] to try and specify the contours of good-faith
negotiations among SEP holders and implementers should not foreshadow a tacit acceptance of a more
European and rules-based formalism to the highly technical and diverse commercial circumstances in
which the licensing of SEPs takes place, and thus presents ground for caution about de facto and ex
ante rulemaking in this area.” ).
269. See JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 236, at 4 n.9 ( “Although the U.S. International
Trade Commission may consider ‘competitive conditions in the United States economy’ as part of its
public interest analysis, see, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1337( d )( 1 ), that does not signify that F/RAND licensing
disputes raise antitrust concerns.” ); see also Muris, supra note 7( “[ I ]n 2019 the Trump administration
issued a new and carefully crafted policy statement that, under guise of rejecting the adoption of ‘a
special set of legal rules’ for SEPs, did precisely that by signaling that the use of otherwise valid antitrust
limitations on breaches of FRAND promises were unjustified—both with respect to exclusion orders
issued by the ITC, as well as through the application of eBay v. MercExchange.” ).
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SEPs in the same way that they are available to other patents.270 That is, a claim for
injunctive relief must meet the requirements set forth in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C. and 19 U.S.C. § 1337, as applicable.271 The eBay framework analyzes whether
a permanent injunction should be granted in U.S. federal courts, and § 1337 is
specific to the International Trade Commission’s ability to exclude imports.272 The
eBay framework includes a four-factor test in which a plaintiff must demonstrate
that (1) “it has suffered an irreparable injury”; (2) legal remedies “such as monetary
damages[ ] are inadequate to compensate for that injury”; (3) “considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant,” a permanent injunction
is warranted; and (4) “the public interest would not be disserved” by excluding the
defendant from practicing the patent.273
This eBay framework makes sense in the U.S. SEP context, especially in light
of the case’s two concurring opinions.274 The concurrence by Chief Justice Roberts
(joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg) stresses that the “historical practice” of
granting injunctions “does not entitle a patentee to a permanent injunction or justify
a general rule that such injunctions should issue.”275 Even more applicable to the
SEP context is the concurrence by Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer), which cautions against issuing injunctions in situations that
sound a lot like patent holdup:
An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing
fees. For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions
arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge
exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.
When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies
seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage
in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.276
As made clear by these concurring opinions, and by the DOJ’s draft revised
policy statement, the eBay framework acknowledges that circumstances specific to

270. JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 236, at 6.
271. Id.
272. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337; eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 ( 2006 ).
273. eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391.
274. Id. at 388–90. Notably, the eBay concurring opinions were joined by a total of seven of
the Justices.
275. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring ).
276. Id. at 396–97 ( Kennedy, J., concurring ) ( emphasis added ) ( citing FED. TRADE COMM’N,
TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
POLICY ch. 3 at 38–39 ( 2003 ), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/6YL6-W2EC] ).
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standard setting must be considered.277 Those circumstances will often weigh
against the granting of an injunction, not because of SSO policies or antitrust law
but per the ordinary application of patent law.278 In fact, even the current Joint
Policy Statement conceded that “the particular F/RAND commitment made by a
patent owner, the S[S]O’s intellectual property policies, and the individual
circumstances of licensing negotiations between patent owners and implementers
all may be relevant in determining remedies for infringing a standards-essential
patent, depending on the circumstances of each case.”279 Once again, this makes
perfect sense; SEP holders should absolutely be entitled to seek injunctions
consistent with SSO policies and individual negotiations, including considerations
of an implementer’s willingness to pay a FRAND royalty.
Thus, the real issue is not when injunctions should be available to patentees
but when antitrust remedies should be available to implementers. The 2020 DOJ
had opined that breaching a FRAND obligation is never an antitrust violation,280
and, as stated above, the relevant footnote to the current Joint Policy Statement said
antitrust law was inapplicable in FRAND licensing disputes.281 This complete denial
of the applicability of antitrust law was problematic. Although antitrust law may not
be applicable to every FRAND licensing dispute, it must remain available when the
disputed conduct involves deception and harms competition.282
Fortunately, the July 9, 2021, Executive Order issued by President Biden called
for revision of the current Joint Policy Statement’s “position on the intersection of
the intellectual property and antitrust laws.”283 The explicit purpose of the revision
is “[t]o avoid the potential for anticompetitive extension of market power beyond
the scope of granted patents, and to protect standard-setting processes from
277. See DRAFT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 6, at 9 ( “Where a SEP holder has made a
voluntary F/RAND commitment, the eBay factors, including the irreparable harm analysis, balance of
harms, and the public interest generally militate against an injunction.” ); see also Muris, supra note
7( “[ T]he legal framework and private incentives already exist to facilitate SEP licensing in a dynamic
commercial environment at which participants are in a much better position to understand than any
governmental bodies.” ).
278. Recall that injunctive relief is an equitable remedy and that the Patent Act requires that
they only be issued on “reasonable” terms. See 35 U.S.C. § 283.
279. JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 236, at 7.
280. See, e.g., Statement of Interest, supra note 1, at 1–2 (“Recognizing a Section 2 cause of
action premised on alleged violations of commitments to offer patent licenses at rates that are FRAND
would ( 1 ) run contrary to the policies underlying the antitrust laws that encourage market-based pricing;
( 2 ) risk distorting licensing negotiations for standard-essential patents (‘SEPs’ ); and ( 3 ) threaten to
deter procompetitive or competitively neutral conduct.” ).
281. JOINT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 236, at 4 n.9 ( seeking to dismiss any ways in which
the 2013 Joint Policy Statement may have been “misinterpreted to suggest that antitrust law is applicable
to F/RAND disputes” ).
282. Wilder, supra note 223( “[ A]ntitrust law is not a mechanism for powerful, incumbent
firms to reduce the royalties they pay to implement standards where competition has not been
harmed . . . . Antitrust enforcement policy should discourage deception and protect competition in the
standards-setting process.” ).
283. Promoting Competition in the American Economy, supra note 5, at 36,991.
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abuse.”284 Moreover, the relevant Supreme Court precedent remains that
manipulating the standard-setting process can give rise to antitrust liability,285 and
federal courts have followed this precedent.286
In any event, there is nothing mutually exclusive about injunctions and
antitrust law; it makes sense to have them both involved to protect licensing
negotiations from becoming too one-sided. If balance is as necessary to keep patent
holders involved in the standard-setting process as both sides say it is,287 then
allowing injunctions while still preserving antitrust liability will be a better answer
than gutting antitrust law.
CONCLUSION
Standards adopted through SSOs after careful selection of the various
technological components are necessary to ensure compatibility, technological
improvements, and consumer welfare.288 FRAND commitments are intended to
prevent the anticompetitive behavior that can result from patented technology
being selected as part of a standard. However, without antitrust law to deter SEP
holders from charging exorbitant royalties or refusing to license their technology, a
FRAND commitment has no teeth. Given that the FRAND commitment is one of
the most important competitive reasons any patent gets anointed as an SEP in the
first place, if it cannot be meaningfully enforced, the consequences could be
extensive. The wrong products may get chosen, output will be reduced, prices will
increase,289 SSOs may attempt to design around a patent or cease work on the
standard altogether,290 and consumers could face more standards wars in lieu of the
beneficial standard-selection process that has come to drive modern technological
advancements. Though tech giants have developed defensive cross-licensing
strategies to combat the real challenge of patent holdup, these strategies do not
solve the problem for everyone. By first excluding upstream rival technologies from
selection in the standard and then excluding downstream companies from
284. Id.
285. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 ( 1988 ) (“[ SSOs]
have traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny.” ).
286. See Amphastar Pharms., Inc. v. Momenta Pharms., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 222, 230 (D. Mass. 2018 )
( “Intentional misrepresentations designed to deceive a standard-setting organization can constitute an
antitrust violation.” ).
287. See Updated IEEE Business Review Letter, supra note 140( “As experience has shown, a
group of implementers working collectively may have both the motive and the means to impose
anticompetitive policies or rules that favor their interests to the detriment of others’. Any such collusion
can also be a serious threat to innovation if the conduct leads to under-investment by patent holders in
the standard-setting process. Balance is therefore important not only to encourage participation and
competition among patent holders in the standard-setting process, but also to ensure more significant
antitrust concerns do not arise.” ).
288. Leslie, supra note 28, at 385.
289. Note, Deception as an Antitrust Violation, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1235, 1239 ( 2012 ).
290. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. CV
15-2370, 2018 WL 4488286, at *6 ( C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2018 ).
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implementing that standard, patent holdup prevents true competition on the merits
and slows innovation at all levels.
Research discredits one of the most notable counterarguments to antitrust
deterrence of patent holdup—the one that claims innovation is disincentivized
when patent holders are afraid to maximize royalties or discriminate amongst
developers. Greater exclusionary rights are far from necessary to drive
innovation.291 On the contrary, the real incentive to innovate comes from patent
holders competing for inclusion in a standard that will provide a steady stream of
reasonable royalties from the implementers who are themselves engaged in further
competition to innovate the best end products.

291.
84, 90.

See Lemley, supra note 111, at 1332, 1335; see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 186, at

